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his paper shows that the Republic of Korea has experienced significant
change in both trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) flows since the
1997 Asian financial crisis.  The analysis indicates that a rapid increase in exports at
the onset of the crisis helped to improve foreign reserves of the Republic of Korea and
also helped the economy to recover from severe recession.  Despite the crisis, the
importance of the Chinese market has steadily increased to the point where it is the
most important export market for the Republic of Korea, largely at the expense of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) market.
The crisis also had a significant impact on FDI inflows, both in terms of source
country and host industry.  FDI increased sharply following the crisis, and this rapid
increase was largely due to higher United States and European Union investment in
the service sector, which is consistent with the wealth effect hypothesis on FDI flows.
Meanwhile, Japanese FDI decreased, resulting in a decline in FDI in the
manufacturing sector.  However, the expected spillover effects of FDI are debatable,
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due largely to a sharp increase in mergers and acquisitions, and FDI dried up in
technology-intensive manufacturing industry.  In contrast, the Republic of Korea’s
outward direct investment seemed to be little influenced by the financial crisis,
although a further study of the implications of the crisis for the Republic of Korea’s
outward direct investment in developing countries, including the traditionally popular
Asian region, also needs to be investigated further.
1. INTRODUCTION
This paper seeks to investigate movements in the Republic of Korea’s trade and
foreign direct investment (FDI) patterns including its outward direct investment (ODI)
following the 1997 Asian financial crisis.  Special attention will be placed on the analysis of
policy issues and the challenges that arose in conjunction with the recovery of the economy
of the Republic of Korea.
Why did the country’s economy recover so quickly from the 1997 financial crisis?
While the causes of the financial crisis are still controversial among economists, the
subsequent recovery of the Republic of Korea’s GDP growth rate was rapid and took the
form of a V-shaped recovery (Aoki and Min, 2003).  The GDP growth rate was 10.9 per
cent in 1999 compared with -6.7 per cent in 1998; it was 9.3 per cent in 2000 although it
dropped somewhat (3.0 per cent) in 2001.1 There are many aspects to the Republic of
Korea’s recovery from both macro- and microeconomic perspectives.
Macroeconomic factors include a decline in interest rates from around 20 per cent
per annum following the crisis to 5-6 per cent, which helped to break the vicious circle of
high interest rates and corporate bankruptcies; they also include uncertainty caused by an
increase in unemployment rates from the historical level of 4 to 11 per cent, motivating
households to increase their savings, which in turn helped to improve the current account in
a climate of poor corporate investment.  Yet another factor was the Government’s successful
effort in rolling-over foreign debts and stabilizing foreign exchange markets (Aoki and Min,
2003).
From a microeconomic perspective the Republic of Korea has restructured both
the corporate and financial sectors.  The collapse of the Daewoo Group and dismantling of
the Hyundai Group demonstrate that the notion that some companies were “too big to fail”
is no longer valid.  This restructuring has improved governance systems and the reliability
of accounting information, strengthened competition policy for business conglomerates
(continued from page 3)
1 The GDP growth rate rose to 7.0 per cent in 2002 but dropped again to 3.1 per cent in 2003.Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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(the so-called chaebol), which helped to enhance economic efficiency and national
competitiveness, and created market-friendly economic reforms such as the introduction of
a managed floating exchange rate system (Min, 1999 and 2003).
Having taken these important domestic factors into account, this paper will focus
on the Republic of Korea’s trade and FDI in the period of crisis and recovery.  It
demonstrates that the impact of the 1997 financial crisis was significant across the
economy.  Special attention will be placed on the recovery of the economy by illustrating
that the information/communication technology-led export boom, combined with policy
reforms and subsequently increased FDI inflows, has significantly contributed to the
recovery.  Some challenges for foreign direct investment (inflows and outflows) and trade
following the crisis will also be discussed.
The paper is structured as follows:  section 2 analyses the Republic of Korea’s
exports and its economic recovery, showing that a sharp increase in exports and foreign
reserves was crucial to both restoring foreign investors’ confidence and capital-market
stabilization.  Section 3 investigates the impact of the financial crisis, focusing on policy
reforms and FDI inflows.  This section shows that the Government of the Republic of Korea
re-emphasized the importance of FDI to secure long-term commitments of foreign capital
and the transfer of advanced technology and managerial know-how.  Section 4 describes
changes in FDI inflows and FDI outflows.  Changes in FDI are discussed both in terms of
source country and host industry.  Some implications of the expansion of the Republic of
Korea’s ODI in Asia will also be explored.  Section 5 examines some challenging issues
such as the externalities controversy surrounding FDI, the terms of trade and market
diversification.  Section 6 contains a summary and conclusions.
2. EXPORT, CURRENT ACCOUNT SURPLUS AND RECOVERY
(a) Exports and growth
Figure 1 illustrates two important factors in relation to the Republic of Korea’s
economy.  First, the fast recovery was led by increased exports and an improved trade
balance.  The Republic of Korea’s trade balance was -$11 billion in 1996 and -$8 billion in
1997, respectively.  However, the balance has shifted both in terms of sign and magnitude
since the crisis.  The Republic of Korea had a surplus in its overall trade balance between
1998 and 2002, with a balance of $29 billion in 1998 and $24 billion in 1999, record
surpluses in the history of the country’s trade balance; however, the figures declined to
about $9-12 billion between 2000 and 2002.
Figure 1 also shows that the GDP growth rate remained relatively high, although it
fluctuated between 9.2 and 5 per cent between 1990 and 1997.  It also indicates the










































































Korea’s GDP contracted by 6.7 per cent in 1998 compared with that of the previous year.
However, the growth rate recovered quickly to 10.9 per cent in 1999 and 9.3 per cent in
2000, respectively.  While it dropped to 3 per cent in 2001, the growth rate bounced back
from 2002 onwards.
Second, exports have been an important determinant of growth in the Republic of
Korea.  Changes in the trade balance reflect the total demand for home goods in the GDP
equation.  The potential benefits of exports for growth are due to the spillover from the
export sector and productivity externalities, higher rates of capital formation and facilitation
of capital imports through a lessening of foreign exchange constraints.
While the employment effects of export growth are still being debated, most of
these benefits seem to have been present in the Republic of Korea’s recovery (see figure 2).
The graph shows the contribution of exports to the Republic of Korea’s GDP growth rate
(left scale), measured by the contribution of exports to GDP growth divided by the GDP
growth rate, and to employment (right scale) over the last three decades.  While both
indicators fluctuated over the period, these figures show that the contribution of exports to
both the GDP growth rate and employment was significant after the 1997 crisis.  In
particular, the contribution of exports to employment after the crisis increased sharply from
about 10 per cent in 1997 to about 18 per cent in 2002.  However, we note that the economy
of the Republic of Korea recently experienced growth without generating additional
employment.  This is largely due to increases in the export of less labour-intensive products
such as information technology (Shin, 2004).  Furthermore, increased ODI in labour-intensive
industries also adversely affected employment opportunities in the Republic of Korea.
The contribution of exports to the economy of the Republic of Korea can also be
confirmed by the high ratio of exports to GDP (EX/GDP) shown in figure 3.  This ratio
remained relatively stable at about 30 per cent before the crisis.  It increased significantly
after the crisis, reaching around 40 per cent, indicating that the importance of exports to the
country’s economy increased.
Figure 1.  GDP growth, exports and trade balance














































































Figure 2.  Export contribution to GDP growth and employment
Source: Ministry of Commerce, Information and Energy (various years).  <www.mocie.go.kr/korean/pds/
statistics/invest>.
Figure 3.  GDP growth and exports, 1980-2001
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics (various years) and Major Statistics of Korean Economy,
(various years).
Note: The ratio of exports to GDP (DEX/DGDP) is calculated by the change in value of exports divided
by change in value of GDP in United States dollars.
However, the movement of exports following the crisis illustrates that a rise in
exports per se does not necessarily increase people’s living standards proportionately.  The
incremental increases in exports as a percentage of GDP (measured by the change in value
of exports divided by the change in value of GDP) indicate that the Republic of Korea’sAsia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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export growth following the crisis was based largely on increased volume facilitated by
lower unit prices (i.e., push factors).  The ratio (DEX/DGDP) in the figure increased in the
early 1990s, but dropped sharply after 1995 when the unit export price dropped sharply.  In
particular, the incremental share dropped below zero in 1998 (and again in 2001), indicating
that the negative effect of lower export prices was more than offsetting the positive effect of
higher export volume following the sharp depreciation of the “won” currency during the
crisis.  While the unit export price did not recover, the increase in the incremental share did
rebound with rising export volumes.
(b) Stabilized foreign exchange market
The current account surplus, coupled with the visible government-led restructuring
of the banking (financial) sector and chaebol, was crucial to the recovery of foreign investor
confidence in the economy of the Republic of Korea.
Most Asian countries, including Japan, experienced a banking crisis during this
period, owing to a large number of non-performing loans (about 14-19 per cent) resulting
from Japan’s “bubble economy” in the 1990s.  However, one of the crucial differences
between the crisis in East Asian countries and in Japan was the amount of available foreign
reserves before the crisis.2 In East Asia low foreign reserves, under a pegged exchange rate
system, triggered speculative attacks on those countries’ currencies and led to herd
behaviour and capital flight.
A current account surplus is crucial to the increase in foreign reserves.  Figure 4
illustrates that the Republic of Korea’s current account mirrored capital inflows until 1997.
However, the sharp increase in the current account surplus following the crisis has been
much larger than capital inflows.  As a result, the foreign reserve level increased
dramatically in 1998.  The increase in the current account surplus declined in 1999,
although the current account remained in surplus.  This surplus, coupled with a fall in net
foreign assets, contributed to higher foreign reserves in 1999.  The amount of foreign
reserves increased from $3.9 billion before the onset of the crisis to around $95 billion in
mid-2000 and $150 billion (33 per cent of GDP in 2000) in late 2003.  This increase in
foreign reserves contributed to a restoration of foreign investor confidence in the value of
the won, as demonstrated by the sharp appreciation of the won from late 1998.
However, an interesting question concerns whether or not foreign reserves are
strictly necessary when a currency has been floated.  Maintaining foreign reserves implies
the existence of quasi-taxation, as the opportunity cost of keeping the reserves is relatively
high.
2 One major difference is that East Asian countries, including the Republic of Korea, relied largely on short-term
foreign debt for their savings-investment imbalance (Aoki and Min, 2003).  Also, Japan adopted a floating































































































3. IMPACT OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS ON THE REPUBLIC OF
KOREA’S GLOBALIZATION POLICY ON FDI
The 1997 financial crisis has led to a significant change in globalization strategies,
including that of the capital market.  In particular, reforms have focused on FDI inflows by
allowing mergers and acquisitions (M and As) and classifying long-term (more than five
years) loans as FDI.
The system of conventional acceptance of FDI notification was changed to one of
simple notification (i.e., a complete notification system) with the introduction and
implementation of the Foreign Investment Promotion Act in November 1998.  This
simplified procedure related to FDI through the acquisition of newly issued stocks (i.e., the
establishment of 100 per cent subsidiaries, joint ventures and participation in capital
increase) and through the acquisition of outstanding stocks.  Foreign investors were allowed
to engage in M and As with the permission of the board of the targeted company and of the
Ministry of Finance and Economy as long as the total size of assets was less than 2 trillion
won (approximately $2 billion).3 In addition, removal of the remaining restrictions on FDI,
including coverage and relevant institutional settings, was noticeable in view of the
significant liberalization of goods before the crisis (Korea Investment Service Center,
1998).4 Long-term loans to improve facilities from foreign investors with a maturity of
more than five years were regarded as FDI.
Out of a total of 1,148 FDI subject sectors, 1,117 sectors were completely opened
and 18 sectors were partially opened to foreign investors at the end of 1998.  Partially
opened industries include cattle-raising, inshore/coastal fishing, alcohol distilling, tobacco,
Figure 4.  Current account, capital account and foreign reserves
Source: Bank of Korea (various years).  National Account.
3 Foreign investors would require permission from the Ministry of Finance and Economy if the size of the
targeted firm is more than 2 trillion won.
4 See Korea Trade Association and Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade (1997) for the tariffs, and
Han (1998) for the liberalization of the service market.Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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power, gambling and some logistics and communication and media-related industries.  The
sectors that remained closed include some areas of national defence.  Protection of the
foreign investors’ remittances of dividends and proceeds from sales generated from stocks
and equities, as well as of principal and interest paid overseas from long-term loan contracts
was strengthened.  Overall, foreign investors enjoyed a more level playing field in the
Republic of Korea.5
Tax incentive systems, finance and land support were also strengthened.  Tax
exemptions and reductions particularly targeted (a) businesses that produce advanced
technologies, (b) service industries that support the manufacturing sector and are designated
as subject to tax exemption and reductions and (c) businesses located in free export zones.6
These benefits include 100 per cent tax exemption for the first 7 years from the year in
which income is first generated and a 50 per cent reduction for the ensuing 3 years.
Financial support includes the allowance of short-term loans by foreign investors in
specified cases.  The Government also designated several new free economic zones, such as
in Kwangju, Cheonan and Incheon, for FDI promotion.
The rationale behind this reform in favour FDI is as follows.  First, having
experienced the adverse effects of the quick decline (capital flight) in short-term capital, the
Government of the Republic of Korea preferred the longer-term commitment of FDI
inflows to short-term capital (portfolio) inflows.  Second, an increase in long-term capital
inflows via FDI was expected to send a positive signal for short-term capital flows on the
capital account.  Third, the Government wanted to improve economic fundamentals by
transferring technology and managerial know-how from multinational enterprises, although
the magnitude of such positive externalities has yet to be investigated.7
4. FDI AND RECOVERY OF FOREIGN INVESTORS’ CONFIDENCE
(a) FDI inflows
As described in section 3, the Government of the Republic of Korea removed
regulations on FDI and strengthened incentives significantly after the 1997 financial crisis.
In addition to its change in globalization policy and a recognized high standard of labour
quality, the improved current account produced by expanded exports and a stabilized
5 In fact, foreign investors enjoy more favourable treatment than citizens of the Republic of Korea in terms of
tax reductions and exemptions and location of investment.
6 These industries include (a) electronics, information and electrical parts such as industry/motor vehicle
controlling systems, (b) precision machinery, (c) materials for basic material industries, (d) new materials,
bio-industry, (e) optical science, medical machinery, (f) airspace, logistics and (g) environment, energy and
construction such as sewerage treatment.
7 See Lee and Cho (2003) concerning the possibility of technology transfer via multinational enterprise in the
information technology industry in the Republic of Korea.Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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foreign exchange market was helpful in the recovery of foreign investor confidence, which
is evidenced by the surge of FDI flows into the Republic of Korea (see figure 5).
FDI inflows were slowly increasing before the 1997 crisis.  The amount of FDI
inflows totaled $1.9 billion in 1995 and $3.2 billion in 1996, but this constituted only 1.5
and 2.5 per cent respectively of the Republic of Korea’s exports.  In contrast to the
dwindling ODI, FDI inflows began to surge from 1997 and maintained strong growth until
2002 when FDI began to decline, a trend that has since continued.  FDI inflows in 1997
were valued at $7 billion, which is more than double the previous year’s figure.  FDI
inflows peaked in 1999 and 2000, reaching $15.5 billion (11 per cent of exports) and
$15.2 billion (8.8 per cent of exports), respectively.  This was followed by a downturn until
2003, although the inflows picked up again in 2004.
The increased FDI inflows following the crisis provide evidence of the recovery in
the confidence of foreign investors in the economy of the Republic of Korea, although the
inflows were also boosted by policy reforms aimed at removing distortions in FDI and the
depreciation of the won currency.  More specifically, this increase is attributable to pull
factors and push factors.  The pull factors were largely generated by policy reforms aimed
at FDI, including granting permission for (hostile) M and As, new fiscal (taxation)
incentives and fewer restrictions on foreign ownership.  The push factors included the
wealth effect created by the depreciation of the won against investors’ home currencies.
Exchange rate movement is a determinant of FDI flows.  For example, the surge of























































Sources: Ministry of Commerce, Information and Energy <www.mocie.go.kr/korean/pds/statistics/invest>;
Overseas Direct Investment Statistics Yearbook 1998; Major Statistics of Korean Economy (various years).
Notes: Outward direct investment is arrival basis and foreign direct investment is notification basis.
Average arrival rate (arrival/notification) for foreign direct investment between 1998 and 2003 was around 60 per cent.Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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Japanese FDI into the United States in the 1980s was associated largely with the
appreciation of the yen against the United States dollar, and this increased the bargaining
power of the Japanese bidder, a phenomenon known as the wealth effect (Froot and Stein,
1991).
The value of the won dropped sharply during the 1997 financial crisis.  At the end
of 1997, the value of the won had depreciated by 40.4 per cent against the United States
dollar and by 33.2 per cent against the Japanese yen compared with its value at the end of
1996.  The trade-weighted CPI-based real exchange rate in the fourth quarter of 1997 and
first quarter of 1998 also had depreciated by 17.6 and 34.0 per cent compared with the
fourth quarter of 1996.  By the end of the first half of 2000, however, the nominal exchange
rate of the won with the Unites States dollar was stable at around 1,120, or 1,060 won per
100 Japanese yen.
The “boom and bust” cycle of FDI along with the onset of the exchange rate crisis
seemed to support the wealth effect hypothesis.  However, the resurgence of FDI in 2004
also indicates that increases in FDI are not sustainable without the foreign investors’
confidence in the host economy.
Table 1 clearly illustrates that increased FDI inflows after the crisis were largely
led by improved United States and European Union investment at the expense of Japanese
investment.  The share of United States investment in the Republic of Korea before the
crisis was around 27-30 per cent, but this increased rapidly after 1996.  United States
investment accounted for the lion’s share of foreign investment in the period 1997-1998,
although it dropped in the period 1999-2000.  However, United States investment rose again
to account for nearly half of FDI inflows in 2002, before dropping sharply to 19.2 per cent
and then resurging to 36.9 per cent in 2004.  The table also indicates that European Union
investment increased continuously until 1999.  However, FDI in the Republic of Korea
from the European Union began to decline in 2000, although it increased sharply in 2003
before declining again in 2004.  The share of Japanese FDI in the Republic of Korea
between 1962 and 1990 was 48.2 per cent.  However, it dropped to 3.8 per cent in 1997,
although it has picked up a little since then.  Despite this recovery, with some fluctuations,
Japanese investment never regained the historically high level recorded between the 1970s
and mid-1990s.
Table 1 also shows a dramatic change in FDI by industry.  Traditionally, most FDI
has flowed into the manufacturing sector.  The share of FDI in manufacturing stayed
between approximately 53 and 65 per cent over the period from 1962 to 1996.  However,
the service sector has recently taken a greater share.  This dramatic change accelerated after
the 1997 crisis.  The service sector’s share of total FDI increased continuously after the
crisis and peaked at 73.1 per cent in 2002.Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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This change in FDI by sector reflects the change in source countries and in the
comparative advantage of the economy of the Republic of Korea.  Most Japanese
investment was directed towards the country’s manufacturing sector, and this is consistent
with the high share (65.4 per cent) of foreign investment in manufacturing in the Republic
of Korea over the period from 1962 to 1990.  Because of increased wages, some areas of
manufacturing in the Republic of Korea seem to have lost their comparative advantage over
China and ASEAN.  In contrast to Japanese investment, United States and European Union
investment in the service sector increased, particularly after the financial crisis.  This
includes investment in the financial sector as well as in the property market.  The
Government of the Republic of Korea planned to sell some troubled banks to foreigners and
to open service markets, including distribution channels, to foreign investors.  Since the
onset of the financial crisis, foreign investors have purchased buildings in Seoul worth more
than $4 billion, which is the reverse situation to the purchase by Japanese investors of
buildings in New York in the late 1980s (Froot and Stein, 1991).  This change in FDI by
sector also supports the wealth hypothesis of FDI inflows.
Table 1.  Foreign direct investment in the Republic of Korea
















1962-1990 7 874 5 337 28.5 12.5 48.2 65.4 34.1
1991-1995 6 598 2 929 29.9 32.5 23.0 53.7 46.4
1996 3 203 968 27.4 27.9 8.0 60.3 39.2
1997 6 971 1 055 45.8 33.1 3.8 33.7 65.8
1998 8 852 1 399 33.6 32.6 5.7 64.8 33.2
1999 15 541 2 173 24.1 40.3 11.3 45.9 53.8
2000 15 697 4 271 18.6 28.0 15.6 43.4 56.3
2001 11 291 3 418 34.4 27.1 6.8 27.4 72.6
2002 9 101 2 435 49.4 18.3 15.4 26.7 73.1
2003 6 468 2 564 19.2 47.3 8.3 26.2 63.9
2004 12 784 3 068 36.9 23.5 17.7 48.6 48.0
Sources: Ministry of Commerce, Information and Energy <www.mocie.go.kr/korean/pds/statistics/invest>;
Overseas Direct Investment Statistics Yearbook 1998; Major Statistics of Korean Economy (various years).
Note: Percentages of total for the periods1962-1990 and 1991-1995 were calculated as follows: sum of
total amount over the period/sum of individual source country over the period.
Period/yearsAsia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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(b) Outward direct investment
While the reforms following the 1997 financial crisis focused on FDI inflows, the
trend of ODI flows has also changed (see figure 5).  In particular, the rapid momentum of
the 1990s seems to have been lost.  The Republic of Korea’s ODI began to surge from the
mid-1980s, when the economy had a significant surplus on the current account, largely due
to a favourable exchange rate and low interest rates in the global capital market.  Owing to
the confidence in the current account balance, the Government gained confidence in capital
account management and removed restrictions on ODI.  Furthermore, domestic production
costs rose sharply, mainly due to the surge in wages.  This rapid upward trend lasted until
the onset of the crisis, followed by a somewhat stagnant period with some fluctuations.
The Republic of Korea’s ODI was led largely by labour-intensive and small and
medium-sized (less than $300,000) manufacturing companies, particularly since the
mid-1980s (Cho, 1995; Bank of Korea, various issues).  Manufacturing’s share of total ODI
increased from 26.4 per cent in 1986 to 56.5 per cent in 1996.  The surge in wages was the
main driving force for the exodus in textiles, clothing and primary and fabricated metals.
Asia (including ASEAN and China) received the lion’s share of this investment, followed
by North America.  In particular, ODI to China rose sharply to exploit geographical
proximity and low labour costs in small and medium-sized firms, followed by ODI to the
United States; Hong Kong, China; and Viet Nam.  In contrast to manufacturing-led ODI to
Asia, the Republic of Korea’s ODI to North America and the European Union was led by
trading companies.  This reflects an attempt by small and medium-sized firms in the
Republic of Korea to export to North America and the European Union directly, rather than
adopting the traditional method of indirect exports through local trading companies.
The relative importance of large-sized firms in ODI seems to have increased
following the 1997 financial crisis.  For example, Hyundai motor company, Samsung and
LG Electronics increased their foreign investment in Asia, North America and the European
Union (including eastern Europe) after 2000.  Despite the crisis, China remained the most
important country for foreign investment in the Republic of Korea.  The share of China in
total ODI fluctuated between 15 per cent in 2001 and 47 per cent in 2003.  In contrast with
FDI, the Republic of Korea’s ODI seemed to be little influenced by the 1997 financial
crisis.  The ODI figure dropped somewhat in 1999 but recovered to the historical level with
some fluctuation until 2003 (figure 5).  This trend reflects the strong Chinese economy and
uncertainty about the United States economy owing to the hostilities in Iraq and rising oil
prices (pull factors), as well as the surge in wages and rather weak business environment in
the home market over the period (push factors).  Manufacturing-led ODI remained
unchanged following the crisis.  This reflected the weak competitiveness of the Republic of
Korea’s non-manufacturing industries in the global market.Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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The implications for small and medium-sized firms are complicated.  In contrast to
large firms, the motivation of small and medium-sized firms in carrying out foreign
investment was largely to overcome export barriers and cut labour costs (Cho, 1995).
Recently, wage costs have risen in China as the economy has maintained high growth.  As
a result, investment in Viet Nam and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, including
the Kaeseong Industrial Complex, has increased.8
5. CHALLENGES FACING THE ECONOMY OF THE REPUBLIC
OF KOREA
(a) Does FDI guarantee positive spillovers?
As described in the previous section, FDI in the service sector has recently
increased sharply vis-à-vis manufacturing.  According to the Korea Trade and Investment
Association (1998, pp. 87-88), the prime reason for subsidizing FDI is to achieve the
transfer of advanced technology by multinationals.  However, the expected technology
transfer effects of FDI seem to be insignificant, as FDI was located in labour-intensive
industries rather than in capital/technology-intensive industries.  At the end of 1996, only
9.4 per cent of FDI was located in the designated industries for technology transfer.
Recent trends in FDI following the financial crisis also indicate that foreign
investment via the acquisition of outstanding stocks has surged.  The share of M and As by
foreign investors was 27.2 per cent in 1998 and 30.7 per cent in 1999, and then declined
somewhat to between 15 and 17 per cent until 2003 (Kim, 2004).  This increase in M and
As following the crisis was due largely to policy reforms allowing M and As by foreigners
and to the collapse of the asset bubble, the so-called “fire sale” following the financial crisis
(Krugman, 1998).  Interestingly, the effects of the fire sale in the manufacturing sector were
evident at the onset of the crisis.  The companies sold include Hansol Pulp and Paper, Halla
Cement and Daewoo Motor Company.  By contrast, most foreign investment in M and As
targeting service industry companies, including banks and communications, was undertaken
with a time lag of two to three years.
A large proportion of foreign investors were from international fund management
groups rather than technology-based multinationals.  As a result, the expected positive
spillover of advanced managerial know-how is also debatable.  The conflict between
Soverign Asset Management Ltd., a Dubai-based investment fund owned by two brothers
from New Zealand, and the Republic of Korea’s third largest business group, SK
Corporation, in 2003 is a good example.  Soverign attempted hostile M and As with SK
when SK had experienced difficulties resulting from an accounting scandal (Kim, 2004).
8 However, this investment is largely to produce imports for consumption in the source country, and political
uncertainties and socialist economic systems in the host countries remain a major hurdle.Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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Soverign purchased 19 million shares in SK at 1,750 won per share.  The share price
increased rapidly while Soverign strategically threatened the owner-chief executive officer
in order to force the company to improve its governance system.  The estimated capital
gain to Soverign from its short-term investment in shares without tax was estimated to be
800 billion won (equivalent to $800 million).9
However, survey results imply that FDI generated positive effects for domestic
firms both in terms of technology and managerial know-how transfer in manufacturing
(Kang and others, 2003).  Furthermore, we need to consider that spillover effects are often
invisible and difficult to measure in the short run.  In addition, the definition of spillover
can be broadly understood including various side effects.  The Soverign-SK incident in
2003 resulted in an improved corporate governance system for SK, with the announcement
of the so-called “New SK Plan”.
(b) Terms of trade and market diversification
Movements in the terms of trade (TOT), as measured by the unit value of exports
divided by the unit value of imports, reflect dynamic structural change in global markets.10
Whether or not worsening TOT are caused by demand or supply factors, a country
experiencing falling TOT will nevertheless receive less in return for each unit of the goods
it exports, and vice versa.
As a result, declining TOT has three important implications for the Republic of
Korea.  First, they erode the positive impacts of improved competitiveness and reduce the
size of the surplus on the current account, given the level of exchange rates and interest
rates.  The worsening of TOT also provides a difficult policy challenge in terms of real
exchange rate alignment.  The Republic of Korea, like many East Asian countries, has often
used a sterilizing intervention approach, regardless of the nature of the shock, mainly due to
government intervention and regulation under conditions of imperfect capital mobility.
However, such sterilizing intervention could also have delayed the alignment (depreciation)
of the real exchange rate in 1996 when the current account deficit was caused by the TOT
shock rather than by the domestic investment boom.  Now, the Republic of Korea faces
9 Similarly, some United States-based companies, including New Bridge Capital and Lone Star, made a huge
amount of short-term capital gains from M and As and reselling banks and commercial buildings in the early
2000s.
10 As a result, the movement in TOT is not caused directly by the changes in the balance of the current account.
The level of investment following the crisis also dropped sharply.  However, the adverse development in TOT
between 1995 and 1996, coupled with the investment boom (including in semiconductors) began in 1994 that
had been triggered by the expected recovery of the global economy, led to a sizeable deficit on the current
account in the Republic of Korea.  This, combined with the absence of prudential supervision, resulted in
short-term foreign borrowing (particularly from financial institutions) and thereby raised the vulnerability of
the economy to the 1997 financial crisis.Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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a TOT shock with a “floating” exchange rate regime and a reasonably sizeable current
account surplus.
Second, TOT affects the country’s per capita standard of living and private
consumption decisions.  Third, the magnitude of the negative impacts of structural change
depends on the elasticity of demand for exports and the ability of exporters to adjust to
changing levels of demand.  The following section focuses on the second and the third
aspects.
(i)  Movements in the terms of trade
Figure 6 shows TOT compared with income TOT and the unit price of the
Republic of Korea’s major export goods (semiconductors) and import goods (petroleum)
during the first quarter of 1994 and the second quarter of 2000.  The figure illustrates
a worsening trend in TOT over the period.  The index value of 73 (1995 = 100) for TOT in
the first half of 2000 was the worst in history.  This deterioration of TOT was largely
attributable to the drop in the unit export price of the Republic of Korea’s exports coupled
with the rising petroleum price since mid-1999.  For example, the unit export price of
semiconductors fell sharply in the mid-1990s, causing a sizeable deficit in the current
account.11 The unit price dropped from 100 in 1995 to less than 50 in 1996, and further
decreased to 12.2 in the second quarter of 2000.  Because of the worsening TOT, the
Republic of Korea needed to increase its volume of exports to improve its current account
balance.
This drop in the unit price of semiconductors is puzzling because the demand for
semiconductors was strong and supply was relatively stable.  The strong United States
economy in the 1990s was largely attributable to the boom in information technology.
While the reasons for the structural adjustment of the semiconductor price have yet to be
analysed, psychological factors in the market following the Asian financial crisis and
concern about the potential information technology-led bubble, coupled with the relatively
short life cycle of the product, seem to have affected cyclical fluctuations in price.
The lower petroleum price following the crisis, combined with the strong recovery
of the global economy, were crucial external factors that enabled the Republic of Korea to
achieve a rapid recovery.  All of the country’s oil is imported from overseas.12 However, the
11 The shares of semiconductors in total manufacturing production and in total exports were 5 per cent and 9 per
cent respectively in the early 1990s.  However, the share in production increased to 13.6 per cent in 1997 and
21 per cent in 1998.  The share in exports also increased to about 13-15 per cent in the late 1990s.  The share
of the Republic of Korea’s electronics production in the global total was 4.4 per cent in 1997, making it the
fourth largest producer following the United States, Japan and Germany.
12 For example, the Republic of Korea’s imports of crude oil in 2000 were worth about $25 billion, which is
equivalent to about 5.4 per cent of GDP in the same year.Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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Figure 6.  Terms of trade, income terms of trade, unit export and











































Source: Bank of Korea (various years).  Economic Statistics Yearbook.
petroleum price began to rise significantly from the second half of 1999 owing to lower
production, and this caused the deterioration in TOT.  The index number for TOT rose from
60 in 1999 to around 150 in late 2000.  Figure 6 also shows that income TOT, which
measures import ability by total exports (value), was rising all the time, a situation largely
due to the increased volume of exports.
Figure 7 shows that the decline in the unit value of heavy and chemical industry
exports has been most noticeable since the mid-1990s.  This decline was caused largely by
lower prices for semiconductors, chemicals and steel.  In contrast, the price index for
information technology-related products, a major emerging export item for the Republic of
Korea, was higher than the average index for heavy products and chemicals.
Was there a pass-through effect of the won currency depreciation on the Republic
of Korea’s imports following the crisis? The pass-through effect of depreciation refers to the
proportion of depreciation that is translated into higher import prices in the depreciating
country, and suggests that the unit price of imports in the depreciating country may also
drop (Knetter, 1993).  The apparent drop in import prices following the crisis seems to be
consistent with this hypothesis.  However, this drop in import prices was caused largely by
the declining prices of petroleum and industrial commodities over the period.  Petroleum
prices declined from $19.30 per barrel of oil in 1997 to $13.70 per barrel in 1998, before
rising to about $30 by mid-2000.13
13 The average quantity of petroleum imports in the Republic of Korea between 1997 and 1998 was about
850 million barrels.Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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The Republic of Korea’s major import suppliers, including the United States and
Japan, may be expected not to respond strategically to the depreciation of the won.  The
market in the Republic of Korea is assumed to be too small for these exporters to take
action in order to preserve their market shares and stabilize prices in the buyer’s currency
relative to a constant markup policy.14 Thus, it is assumed that the decline in the unit value
of exports is proportionately larger than that in imports.  By the same token, there was no
difference in the Republic of Korea’s bilateral trade balance with Japan and the United
States.  However, the depreciation of the won vis-à-vis the Japanese yen raised the won cost
of imports to the Republic of Korea (the dollar price, however, was unchanged and thus the
trade balance remained the same in dollar terms), and the profit margins of firms in the
Republic of Korea in local currency were squeezed by intermediate imports from Japan.  As
a result, the Republic of Korea’s dependency on Japan for intermediate imports could
moderate the positive effects of depreciation on exports at a given profit margin.
Source: IMF (various years).  International Financial Statistics.
Note: Unit export price (light industry) is unit value index of exports for light industry, unit export price
heavy and chemical industry is that for heavy and chemical industry, and information technology is that for
information technology-related products.
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14 Athukorala and Menon (1994) also confirm that the incomplete pass-through of exchange rate changes is
pervasive with Japanese exports.  However, the paper rejects the widely held view that Japanese export firms
have relied more heavily on pricing to market strategies during the period of yen appreciation in order to
maintain market share.  In spite of this, whether or not Japanese exporters and United States exporters showed
different pricing behaviours in the Republic of Korea following the crisis is an interesting empirical question.
The Republic of Korea was the second largest market for United States exports in Asia.  The share of the
Republic of Korea and Japan in United States exports was 3.7 and 11.4 per cent respectively and that in United
States imports was 3.5 and 18.7 per cent respectively in 1991.Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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(ii) Export market destinations:  demand for exports
Table 2 indicates three important points regarding the Republic of Korea’s export
markets.  First, the Republic of Korea has diversified its export markets over the last two
decades.  Until the crisis, exports to ASEAN and China increased at the expense of those to
the United States.  The traditional heavy reliance on the United States market had been
declining until the onset of the crisis.  Exports to the United States rose until the mid-1980s,
reaching a peak of 40.7 per cent of the total in 1986, and then began declining to 1997
(the net exports to the United States between 1980 and 1990 increased by 13.9 per cent, but
between 1990 and 1997 they declined by 48.7 per cent).
Table 2.  Shares of the Republic of Korea’s major export countries
(Percentage)
United
United States Japan Kingdom- China
Germany
1980 (A) 26.7 17.7 8.4 6.6 (5.0) 0.1
1985 40.3 17.1 7.1 5.7 (3.9) 0.2
1990 (B) 30.4 19.9 7.2 8.8 (5.9) 0.9
1995 19.4 13.7 7.1 13.6 (8.2) 7.4
1996 16.7 12.1 6.1 14.9 (9.9) 8.8
1997 (C) 15.6 10.7 6.3 13.8 (9.6) 9.8
1998 17.3 9.3 6.2 11.4 (8.3) 9.0
1999 (D) 20.5 10.9 6.2 12.0 (8.6) 9.5
2000 21.8 11.9 6.1 10.6 (7.3) 10.7
2001 20.7 11.0 5.2 9.5 (6.8) 12.1
2002 20.2 9.3 5.2 11.3 (8.7) 14.6
2003 17.6 8.9 5.0 10.4 (8.1) 18.1
2004 16.9 8.5 5.5 9.5 (7.3) 19.6
Coefficient of variationa 36.7 27.7 11.6 31.8(29.8) 78.1
Adjustment rate
(B-A)/A*100 13.9 12.4 -14.2 33.3(18.0) 800.0
(C-B)/B*100 -48.7 -46.2 -12.5 56.8(62.7) 988.9
(D-C)/C*100 30.1 1.8 -1.6 -13.1(-10.4) -4.1
Source: Korea Foreign Trade Association (various years).  Trend of Foreign Trade.
a  Standard deviation/mean *100.2 (1980-1999).
b ASEAN 5 is composed of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.
c In ASEAN 4, Singapore is excluded from the ASEAN 5 list of countries.
ASEAN 5b
(ASEAN 4)cAsia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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In contrast, the shares of exports to ASEAN and China rose sharply until the onset
of the crisis.  The Republic of Korea’s exports to ASEAN included capital-intensive goods
to support the industrialization of that region.  Noticeably, this fast growth in exports to
ASEAN took place in conjunction with the surge in the Republic of Korea’s ODI to the
region over the period.  Exports to China surged dramatically in the mid-1990s due mainly
to the establishment of diplomatic relations in the early 1990s, as well as to the country’s
geographical proximity.  Meanwhile, exports from the Republic of Korea to the United
Kingdom and Germany were relatively stable, although they have declined since the crisis.
Because of the increase in exports to ASEAN and China, the Republic of Korea was able to
diversify its export markets away from its heavy reliance on the United States market
between 1980 and 1997.
Second, this geographical composition has changed since the crisis.  In particular,
the relative importance of the United States market increased again until 2000, when it once
again began to decline.  In particular, China emerged as an important market, especially at
the expense of the ASEAN and Japanese markets.  The strong United States economy over
the last 10 years has led to an increase in imports, whereas the ASEAN economy lost
purchasing power following the crisis.15 The strong United States economy was largely
attributed to the growth in information technology industries, which raised the demand for
semiconductors, the Republic of Korea’s most important export item.
This change in relative importance is indicated by the adjustment ratio (measured
by (D-C)/C*100 in table 2), with a ratio of 30.1 per cent for the United States, compared
with -13.1 per cent for the five founding members of ASEAN.16 As a result, the share of
these developed countries increased from 32.6 per cent in 1997 to 37.4 per cent in 1999.
However, it is not certain whether this higher reliance on developed countries rather than
developing ones suggests that exports will be more stable.  The information on the
coefficient of variation, as measured by the standard deviation divided by the mean, seems
to suggest that exports to the United States market were more volatile than those to other
markets.17 In fact, the Republic of Korea currently faces some major challenges in United
States trade, such as an expected increase in competition for the market from other
countries affected (depreciation of currencies) by the 1997 crisis as well as protectionist
pressures caused by the imbalance in trade between the United States and the Republic of
Korea.
Third, the sustained growth of the Chinese economy and the recovery of the
ASEAN and Japanese economies are factors also crucial to the Republic of Korea’s exports
and growth.  While there was a drop in the relative importance of the ASEAN markets
15 In the late 1990s, the United States GDP accounted for around a quarter of the global GDP.
16 The extraordinarily high number for China was due to the small number of base years (1980 and 1990) and
thus comparative analysis provides little information.
17 Refer to footnote 8.Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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following the crisis, the complementary relationship between the Republic of Korea and the
region indicates the importance of these markets for the country’s exports.  However, the
relative importance of the ASEAN market after 2000 fluctuated somewhat; it was below its
historical trend in the mid-1990s.  Recently, the Japanese market has experienced
fluctuations within an overall declining trend, and is still less significant than it was before
the crisis.
The importance of the China market is particularly noticeable.  In 1999, China
emerged as the third largest single market for exports from the Republic of Korea (9.4 per
cent of total exports) followed by the United States (20.3 per cent) and Japan (10.9 per
cent), although the five founding members of ASEAN (12.0 per cent), as a region, is the
most important destination.  The importance of China increased continuously until 2004.
China’s share in the Republic of Korea’s total exports was 14.6 per cent, making China the
second most important market for exporters in the Republic of Korea in 2002.  When
combined with Hong Kong, China, the share was 20.8 per cent, making it the Republic of
Korea’s most important market in that year.  This increasing importance of the China
market occurred despite the 1997 crisis.  The share of that market in the Republic of
Korea’s total exports reached 19.6 per cent, and it became the single most important
destination for exports from the Republic of Korea in 2004.
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This analytical research study indicates that the Republic of Korea has experienced
significant changes in both trade and FDI inflows as well as outflows following the 1997
Asian financial crisis.  The Republic of Korea’s reliance on the United States market and
China for its exports rose sharply following the crisis.  In particular, China has emerged as
the most important export destination, largely at the expense of the ASEAN market.  This
was due to its geographical proximity to the Republic of Korea and the increased
competitiveness of Korean products in the China market.  The United States consumption
of products from the Republic of Korea increased sharply at the onset of the crisis.  This
was critically important for the restoration of foreign reserves and the subsequent
stabilization of the capital market, although the relative importance of the United States
market has declined again since 2001.
The increase in the surplus on its current account helped the Republic of Korea to
restore foreign investors’ confidence in the economy, which is evidenced by the surge in
foreign direct investment.  The crisis had a significant impact on FDI inflows both in terms
of investment source and host industry.  FDI increased sharply following the crisis and this
rapid increase was due largely to improved United States and European Union investment
in the service sector, which is consistent with the wealth hypothesis of FDI inflows.  In
particular, M and As by foreign investors increased significantly following the crisis.
Meanwhile, Japanese FDI dried up, although it picked up again sharply in 2004, and thisAsia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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caused the overall drop in FDI in the manufacturing sector.  However, the magnitude of
expected spillover effects from multinationals, including the transfer of advanced
technology and managerial know-how, is still the subject of debate, which requires further
investigation.  Further study is needed on the implications (e.g., supply chain management
and internationalization strategy) of the crisis for the Republic of Korea’s ODI (particularly
from small and medium-sized firms) in the context of developing countries, especially in
the Asian and Pacific region.Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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ABSTRACT
T
he impact of trade liberalization on the environment is a matter of debate.
Two conflicting hypotheses have emerged from the debate.  One, the
pollution haven hypothesis, suggests that the developed countries impose tougher
environmental policies than do the developing countries, which results in distortion of
existing patterns of comparative advantage.  Thus, the polluting industries shift
operations from the developed to the developing countries; developing countries
therefore become “pollution havens.” The second hypothesis, the factor endowment
hypothesis, predicts that trade liberalization will result in trade patterns consistent
with the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek theory of comparative advantage based on factor
endowment differentials.  Rich countries are well endowed with capital.  Since
capital-intensive goods are often also pollution-intensive, factor-endowment theories
of international trade predict that rich countries specialize in polluting goods.  Thus,
the manifestation of the pollution haven hypothesis is in direct conflict with the factor
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endowment hypothesis.  This debate is of great concern among economists,
environmentalists and the World Trade Organization.
Among all South and South-East Asian countries, Thailand can be regarded as
one of the fastest growing economies.  The average annual growth rate between 1980
and 2004 was about 7 per cent (NESDB, 2003).  This high economic growth rate was
led by the growth in the manufacturing sector.  Liberalization of trade has been the
main driver and cornerstone of growth in the Thai economy.  Countries in the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) are major trading
partners of Thailand and hold a consistent share of the country’s total trade:
approximately 55 per cent during the period from 1980 to 2000 (Bank of Thailand,
various years).  Throughout the past four decades, Thailand has been a significant
recipient of foreign direct investment (FDI) among developing countries and these
inflows boomed in the period 1995-2000.  An important proportion of FDI has been
from OECD countries.  The major receiving sector of OECD investment is industry,
the share of which has increased from 52.7 per cent of the total in 1990 to 62.6 per
cent in 2000.  This paper evaluates the impact on the environment of Thailand’s trade
with OECD countries, focusing on the two hypotheses during the period 1980 to
2000.  Further, it examines the implications of FDI for the environment.  The
framework of the analysis is based on the input-output approach extended and
modified for the purpose of this study.  Results show that Thailand was a pollution
haven in 2000, which does not support the factor endowment hypothesis.  Moreover,
FDI promotes exports that have impacts on the environment.  Policy implications are
discussed in the paper.
1. INTRODUCTION
One of the major policy challenges of the decade is to promote liberal trade while
protecting the environment and preserving natural resources.  International trade contributes
to economic growth and benefits all participating countries, while economic growth, in turn,
increases the demand for environmental quality.  This complex relationship between trade
and the environment has generated debate.  Two conflicting hypotheses have emerged from
the debate.  The first one, the pollution haven hypothesis, suggests that the developed
countries impose tougher environmental policies than do developing countries, which
results in distortion of existing patterns of comparative advantage.  Thus, polluting
industries shift operations from the developed to the developing countries; developing
countries therefore become “pollution havens”.  The second hypothesis, the factor
endowment hypothesis, predicts that trade liberalization will result in trade patterns
consistent with the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek theory of comparative advantage based onAsia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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factor-endowment differentials.  Developed countries are well endowed with capital.  Since
capital-intensive goods are often also pollution-intensive, factor-endowment theories of
international trade predict that developed countries specialize in producing polluting goods.
Thus, the manifestation of the pollution haven hypothesis is in direct conflict with the factor
endowment hypothesis.  This debate is of great concern to economists, environmentalists
and the World Trade Organization (WTO).
Thailand is a good laboratory for testing these two hypotheses.  Among all South
and South-East Asian countries, Thailand can be regarded as one of the fastest growing
economies.  The average annual economic growth rate between 1980 and 2004 was about
7 per cent.  The country’s liberalized trade policy has been the main driver and cornerstone
of this growth.
Thai exports have increased significantly by 45 per cent in the period 1980-1985,
342 per cent by 1990, 955 per cent by 1995 and a staggering 2,406 per cent by 2003.  Just
as Thailand’s exports experienced rapid growth so have its imports.
OECD countries are major trading partners of Thailand and account for
a consistent share of approximately 55 per cent of the country’s total trade during the period
from 1980 to 2000.  Thai exports to OECD countries doubled in value terms with
diversification since the mid-1990s, whereas imports from OECD countries followed a less
regular trend.  In terms of investment, the OECD share was more than 65 per cent in 2000,
the most important source of foreign direct investment in Thailand; it was followed by that
of the Asian newly industrialized economies.  Thailand’s intra-industry trade has also grown
significantly.
The diversification of the structure of Thailand’s trade with OECD countries and
the inflow of FDI has important implications for the environment and this matter needs to
be researched.  The current paper evaluates the impact on the environment of Thailand’s
trade with OECD countries, focusing on the two conflicting hypotheses (pollution haven
and factor endowment) during the period from 1980 to 2000.  Further, it analyses the
implications for the environment of FDI from OECD countries.
The organization of the paper is as follows:  the literature dealing with trade and
environment is reviewed in section 2; discussions on the results are presented in sections 3
and 4; section 5 concludes with some policy implications; and information on the
methodology and the data are provided in the appendix.
2. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
The literature linking trade and environment is growing (Tobey, 1990; Lucas and
others, 1992; Low and Yeates, 1992; Mani and Wheeler, 1998; Cole and Elliott, 2001; XingAsia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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and Kolstad, 2002; Eskeland and Harrison, 2003; Copeland and Taylor, 2003; Javorcik
and Wei, 2005; Waldkirch and Gopinath, 2004).  Several attempts have been made to use
input-output models to address the issue (Wyckoff and Roop, 1994; Gale and Lewis, 1995;
Antweiler, 1996; Proops and others, 1999; Machado and others, 2001; Munksgaard and
Pedersen, 2001).  However, only a few have addressed the pollution haven hypothesis and
factor endowment hypothesis using the input-output model (Mukhopadhyay and
Chakraborty, 2005a and 2005b).
The brief review of the literature suggests that the empirical evidence is still far
from clear (Copeland and Taylor, 2004).  The methodologies employed to test the
hypotheses widely vary as do the results.  Discussions about Thailand’s trade-environmental
relationship has received some attention in recent years (UNCTAD/UNDP, 1994; TDRI,
1996 and 2000; Jha and others, 1999; TEI, 2000).  Unfortunately, no comprehensive work
has been done in Thailand involving these issues together, in particular using input-output
techniques.
3. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS OF THE MODEL
(a) Does a pollution haven matter for Thailand?
Japan, the United States and the European Union are Thailand’s main trading
partners.  Since the pollution haven hypothesis originates from the North-South debate, the
evidence on Thailand’s trade with OECD countries will throw insight on the debate.  An
index known as the pollution terms of trade (equation 6) has been used to capture the
pollution haven effect.  The results are presented in table 1.
Table 1.  Pollution terms of trade of Thailand with OECD countries for emissions of
carbon dioxide, sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxides from 1980 to 2000
Thousands of tons of Thousands of tons of Thousands of tons of
Emission  carbon dioxide  sulphur dioxide nitrogen oxides
1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000
Pollution embodied 4 120.11 2 711.49 8 579.35 41.55 26.14 83.11 9.13 11.76 35.47
in exports
Pollution embodied 8 433.57 3 014.48 5 573.90 82.79 27.29 50.72 19.58 19.87 35.34
in imports
Pollution terms of 0.4885 0.8994 1.5392 0.5018 0.95786 1.6384 0.4664 0.5917 1.003
trade
Pollution terms of 48.85 89.94 153.92 50.18 95.78 163.84 46.64 59.17 100.39
trade*100
Source: Results are calculated by the author based on equation 6 in the methodology section in the appendix.Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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The values of the indices as displayed in table 1 show dramatic changes.  The
pollution terms of trade reveal an increasing trend of the indices during the period from
1980 to 2000 for all three pollutants.  The values of the pollution terms of trade were below
100 during the 1980s and 1990s.  In contrast, the values of the pollution terms of trade for
2000 were above 100 for all three pollutants.  These results imply that Thailand exports
dirty goods and imports clean goods.  This finding seems to support, or at least not
contradict, the pollution haven hypothesis for Thailand in the year 2000.  In other words,
Thailand’s trade with OECD countries has had varied implications for the environment over
the period 1980-2000.  In the 1980s, the environmental impact was moderate but with the
passage of time its severity increased; by the end of 2000, Thailand’s trade with OECD
countries created unfavourable impacts on the environment, thus turning Thailand into
a pollution haven.  Why has this happened? This question is explored in the following
paragraphs.
The most prominent sectors in respect of the shares of exports and imports during
the study period are presented in tables 2 and 3, respectively.  Table 2 reveals a significant
change in the composition of exports.  The structure of Thailand’s exports in the 1990s has
diversified into a wide variety of products compared with those in the 1970s and 1980s.
Table 2.  Share of exports of Thailand to OECD countries for the top 10 sectors
(Percentage)
Major sectors 1980 Major sectors 1990 Major sectors 2000
Food and food products 34.17 Food and food products 15.85 Radio, television sets, 24.01
communication equipment
Non-ferrous basic metals 16.64 Miscellaneous services 14.12 Electrical and electronic 14.77
appliances
Rubber products 9.90 Radio, television sets, 12.44 Industrial machinery 10.09
communication equipment
Jewellery and related 6.22 Jewellery and related 8.56 Food and food products 9.97
articles articles
Textiles 5.83 Leather and leather products 7.25 Miscellaneous 6.95
manufacturing industries
Agricultural products 5.75 Other transport services 5.85 Other transport equipment 4.45
Electrical and electronic 4.93 Textiles 5.57 Miscellaneous metal 4.33
appliances products
Miscellaneous services 3.29 Miscellaneous 5.29 Jewellery and related 3.05
manufacturing industries articles
Miscellaneous 2.67 Electrical and electronic 4.85 Iron and steel 2.88
manufacturing industries appliances
Other transport services 1.57 Industrial machinery 4.21 Wood and wood products, 2.84
including furniture
Source: The share of exports and imports has been calculated by the author from input-output table of
Thailand, 1980, 1990, 2000.Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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Thailand’s major exports in 1980 comprised food and food products, with a 34.17 per cent
share.  It dropped to 9.97 per cent in 2000.  During the 1970s, agriculture was the main
contributor to GDP and agricultural exports remained the main driving force behind the
country’s overall economic growth.  From the late 1980s, the situation went into reverse
and farm acreage shrank (Phongpaichit and Baker, 2003).  The population directly
supported by agriculture dropped by almost 4 million.  Agriculture’s contribution to GDP
also declined.  This rapid decline was partly a result of falling prices, faltering global trade
and competition in the global rice market.  Once the export-led industrial boom began in the
mid-1980s, both public and private investment began to be concentrated in the urban
economy to the detriment of agriculture.  During the 1980s and 1990s, the orientation was
more on textiles, rubber products and leather.  On the other hand, radios, television sets,
communication equipment, industrial machinery and electrical and electronic appliances
together captured market shares of 21.55 per cent in 1990 and 48.87 per cent in 2000.
Demand for these goods is favourable in the international market.  These figures reveal how
with the passage of time Thailand has become an exporter of manufactured goods to OECD
countries, while the role of agriculture is declining.  Another interesting feature observed in
Thailand’s trade with OECD countries is intra-industry trade.  For example, Thailand
imports from the United States and Japan raw materials for manufacturing electrical and
electronic appliance products; it then exports the final product after assembly.  For some
Table 3.  Share of imports of Thailand from OECD countries for the top 10 sectors
(Percentage)
Major sectors 1980 Major sectors 1990 Major sectors 2000
Industrial machinery 15.59 Industrial machinery 24.81 Radio, television sets, 21.10
communication equipment
Iron and steel 9.40 Other transport equipment 16.73 Industrial machinery 10.41
Miscellaneous services 8.38 Iron and steel 11.69 Miscellaneous metal 8.83
products
Basic chemicals 7.71 Electrical and electronic 9.75 Other transport equipment 8.17
appliances
Other transport equipment 6.99 Miscellaneous metal 6.97 Electrical and electronic 7.54
 products appliances
Miscellaneous metal 6.79 Non-ferrous basic metals 4.04 Iron and steel 6.96
products
Other chemicals 6.30 Basic chemicals 3.65 Basic chemicals 5.33
Electrical and electronic 4.62 Radio, television sets, 3.46 Miscellaneous 4.05
appliances communication equipment manufacturing industries
Fertilizers 4.17 Plastic products 2.31 Jewellery and related 3.43
articles
Textiles 3.61 Textiles 2.23 Food and beverages 2.94
Source: The share of exports and imports has been calculated by the author from input-output table of
Thailand, 1980, 1990, 2000.Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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industries, Thailand acts as a component supplier; assembly of the final product is provided
by the developed country.
The composition of the imported commodities has not changed significantly.  The
major sectors predominantly are basic chemicals, radio and television sets, communication
equipment, other transport equipment, electrical and electronic appliances, iron and steel,
and industrial machinery (see table 3).  A large part of Thai imports are capital goods and
intermediate products and raw materials which are used in expanding industrial capacity
and supply inputs for many of Thailand’s export industries.
The high value of the pollution terms of trade (more than 100) in 2000 was due to
the high level of pollution generated by export-intensive sectors.  Several questions might
arise in this respect.  Why has the composition of the traded commodities in Thailand
changed? Why is Thailand exporting pollution-intensive goods at the cost of the
environment? Are government policies not stringent enough to tackle these problems? To
address all these issues it is necessary to take a critical look at the government policies,
especially those relating to trade and environment.
Thailand’s first national economic development plan was launched in 1961; it
focused on import substitution in order to promote industrialization.  The use of tariffs was
the major instrument to influence the country’s development path and Thailand effectively
began in 1974 to promote domestic industry.  A shift in the country’s trade policy of export
promotion has taken place, resulting in a reduction in tariff since the mid-1980s.  The
maximum rate was reduced from 100 per cent in the early 1990s to 30.24 per cent by the
end of the 1990s, to 21 per cent in 1995 and to 17.01 per cent in 1997.
To promote exports, the Government of Thailand adopted several measures,
especially after the 1980s (for example, lifting of export quota, reducing export duties on
several commodities, providing business tax exemptions, promoting investment in
manufacturing industries with strong export potential, such as those producing automobiles
and parts, and extending export credit).
Thus, the Thai economy changed gears after the mid-1980s.  As a result, the export
of manufactures and services grew almost sixfold in six years.  In the latter half of the
1980s, major Japanese firms transferred production processes to Thailand.  Foreign
investment in Thailand accelerated considerably from 1988 to 1990.  The first stage of
growth in export industries was focused mostly on labour-intensive and resource-based
industries and led by domestic or joint ventures with Thai firms which had originally been
established to supply the domestic market.  By the end of that decade, foreign investment
had begun to change the export mix towards technology-based products.  Textile firms from
Japan and garment firms from Hong Kong, China and Taiwan Province of China had
relocated production to Thailand and other overseas sites since the 1970s.  Such firms wereAsia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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highly pollution intensive.  Several major gem- and diamond-cutting businesses relocated to
Thailand.  After the 1990s, over half of the total exports increased basically from
technology-based industries, especially automotive parts, computer parts and electrical
goods which are highly pollution intensive (Lucas and others, 1992).  By the late 1990s,
Thailand had become one of the world’s largest assemblers of disk drives for computers,
and emerged as a regional centre for automobile manufacture.  The three subsectors of
automotive vehicles and parts, electrical goods and computer parts contributed significantly
to total exports.  Thailand’s trade history reflects how the pollution-intensive industries
relocated to Thailand.  In this context, it may be said that Thailand always followed the
strategy of “grow first, clean up later”.
Thailand’s proactive and ambitious trade policies aggressively pushed to increase
the country’s share of the global export market by means of establishing a healthy
collection of bilateral and regional free trade agreements with its trading partners.  Thailand
signed the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization protocol
concluding the Uruguay round.  The development of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) has had an impact on Thai trade patterns with the United States.
While NAFTA gives Thailand access to a larger market (United States, Canada and
Mexico), Thailand also faces increased price competition from Mexico in some product
lines.  Another issue affecting Thai exports is the use of antidumping measures and
countervailing duties on Thai products, as initiated by United States producers and carried
out by the Government of the United States.  However, United States investment has
resulted in significant technology transfer to Thailand, which has created a great impact on
the country’s economy.  Further, a “free trade area” under the framework of ASEAN was
initiated by Thailand in June 1991; its goal was to integrate production structures towards
improving the export outlook of ASEAN in the global market.
Although the above-mentioned trade strategies and policies relating to trade
liberalization helped Thailand to diversify and boost its exports, this situation was not
favourable to the environment.  This adverse outcome has been made worse by the
weakness of, and non-compliance with, environmental regulations.
Environmental regulations:  To combat environmental deterioration resulting
from trade-oriented growth, several pieces of environmental legislation were introduced
in the past few years.  The first such legislation was passed in 1975.  However, a more
comprehensive piece of environmental legislation is the 1992 Enhancement and
Conservation of National Environmental Quality Act, which provides for a strong
command-and-control regulatory framework to set standards and to monitor and enforce
them.  That Act strengthens existing laws within a policy framework outlined in the Seventh
National Economic and Social Development Plan (1991-1996), which emphasized
environmental standards.  Another important legal instrument is the 1992 Factories Act,
which regulates waste discharge from industrial plants.  Similarly, the 1992 HazardousAsia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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Substances Act provides control over the production, import and export or possession of
hazardous substances that could become hazardous waste in the future.  The Government
introduced the Energy Conservation and Promotion Act in 1992 in order to promote and
initiate energy conservation among all parties.
In addition, several policies were introduced for improving air quality.  Two main
government agencies have direct responsibility for monitoring air quality.  The Pollution
Control Department has established networks for monitoring air quality in five regions of
Thailand and a total of 52 air quality monitoring stations are in operation.
A number of measures have been enforced to reduce ambient carbon monoxide
concentrations.  New automobiles must be equipped with specific pollution-control devices,
such as catalytic converters, and fuel for vehicles must contain certain levels of oxygen in
order to reduce the generation of carbon monoxide.  The Government has also taken some
steps to lower the sulphur content in fuel.  For example, an order was issued in July 1994 to
lower the sulphur content in fuel oil residues used in Bangkok and surrounding areas;
sulphur content is not to exceed 2 per cent of the fuel by weight (TDRI, 2000).  The same
order was restructured in 1998 and again in 1999 to limit nationwide the sulphur content of
fuel oil residues.
In spite of all these efforts, the implementation of the regulations has been far
below expectations, as described in a report providing a detailed analysis of the reasons
(TDRI, 2000).  Lack of enforcement is a basic problem in Thailand.  The degradation of the
environment is the result of institutional failure, among other reasons.  The policies, rules
and organizations created to protect the environment also are not effective.  One of
Thailand’s major strategies has been to encourage the private sector to play a key role in the
economy.  However, the private sector does not always support and promote environmental
quality by adopting environment-friendly production processes.  Moreover, although the
country has no suitable environmental tax, Thailand proceeded to apply some tax measures
to control pollution as of May 1997.  Nonetheless, the December 2002 Environmental
Sustainability Index, which was calculated by the World Economic Forum 2000 to show the
state of the environment and how it is affected by human activities, ranked Thailand 46th out
of 56 countries in terms of environmental sustainability.  In a recent study, Rock (2002)
discussed in detail the pollution management strategies in East Asia, comparing the
performance of several economies (China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan
Province of China and Thailand) concluded that “to date, Thailand has had the least success
in reducing industrial pollution and improving ambient environmental quality”.  Lax
environmental regulations and non-compliance have thus distorted the pattern of
comparative advantage in Thailand.  The differences in the cost of complying with
environmental regulations in Thailand compared with OECD countries have resulted in
OECD countries relocating some industries in Thailand, thus pushing Thailand further
towards being a pollution haven.Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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In this connection, it should be noted that differences in pollution policy are only
one of many factors that affect trade.  Relative production costs are determined not by
pollution regulations alone and they are not an important determinant of costs (Copeland
and Taylor, 2003).  If other factors dominate to outweigh the effects of pollution policy on
comparative advantage, trade may not result in a concentration of polluting industries in
countries with weak environmental regulations.  Developed countries are relatively capital
abundant compared with developing countries, which are relatively labour abundant.
Traditional factor-endowment effects would give a comparative advantage to high-income
countries in dirty industries.
Whether additional motives for trade change these results needs to be examined.
In other words, the next task is to investigate the role of factor endowments in determining
Thailand’s trade with OECD countries during the same period.
(b) Evidence relating to the factor endowment hypothesis
Estimates of capital and labour requirements to produce exports and imports worth
1,000 baht in 1980, 1990 and 2000 respectively, derived by equations 7 to 10, are reported
in table 4.
The results show that Thailand’s exports required more capital than did its imports
in 2000 (imports are 5 per cent less capital intensive than exports).  On the other hand,
Thailand’s imports were 33 per cent and 20 per cent more capital intensive than exports in
Table 4. Capital and labour requirements in exports and imports
(Thailand and OECD countries)
1980 1990 2000
Capital Labour Capital Labour Capital Labour
requirements requirements requirements requirements requirements requirements
per 1,000 baht per 1,000 baht per 1,000 baht per 1,000 baht  per 1,000 baht per 1,000 baht
of output of output of output of output of output of output
Exports Akx = Alx = Akx = Alx = Akx = Alx =
189003680.5 1321655.8 780161741.8 1872121.8 1713874498.0 1792523.8
Imports Akm = Alm = Akm = Alm = Akm = Alm =
273144212.6 1432131.2 530122021.1 1057617.2 1165240358.1 1272383.7




Kx = Akx/Alx = 143.005 Kx = Akx/Alx = 416.725 Kx = Akx/Alx = 956.1236
Km =Akm/Alm = 190.725 Km =Akm/Alm = 501.241 Km =Akm/Alm = 915.793
Km = 1.33 Kx Km = 1.20 Kx Km = 0.95 KxAsia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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1980 and 1990 respectively (table 4).  According to the theory of factor abundance,
Thailand, a developing economy, is supposed to export labour-intensive goods and import
capital-intensive ones.  However, Thailand was exporting capital-intensive goods in 2000.
Thus, the evidence does not support the factor endowment hypothesis for Thailand for the
year 2000, while it does for 1980 and 1990.
Why is this so? The shifting of exports from agriculture to manufacturing and
from manufacturing to the emerging groups is one of the most important reasons for the
change of production technology, from labour-intensive to capital-intensive technology.
The scarcity of skilled labour has been another problem (Bank of Thailand, various years).
Table 5 shows how Thailand has shifted its export economy from labour intensity to capital
intensity.
Table 5.  Percentage of labour and capital intensiveness in share of exports
Exports (share of total) 1981-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000
Labour share 15.7 27.8 25.9 16.7
Capital share (technology based) 7.0 20.9 39.9 54.2
Source: Bank of Thailand, Quarterly Bulletin (various issues).
During the first half of the 1980s the share of labour was more than that of capital,
while in the first half of the 1990s, the share of capital was more than that of labour and in
the second half of that decade the share was more than double that of labour.  The transfer
of technology with huge foreign investments in Thailand started coming from OECD
countries (especially Japan and the United States).  Industries which were set up in Thailand
after the 1990s by other countries were generally large scale and capital intensive, with less
employment-generation.  Furthermore, the opening of such low-cost locations as China and
Viet Nam undermines Thailand’s comparative advantage in labour-intensive manufacturing
to more skill- and capital-intensive activities.  The export sectors with high employment and
strong linkages, namely, agriculture, and resource-based and labour-intensive manufacturing,
grew minimally.  The resources have moved out of labour-intensive agricultural industries
into more capital- and skill-intensive manufacturing and services industries.  Thus, the
above discussion provides an explanation why Thailand’s exports were more capital
intensive than labour intensive in 2000.
So far the paper has evaluated the impact of liberalized trade on the environment,
focusing on two hypotheses:  pollution haven and factor endowment.  In this connection it
has investigated the role of environmental regulations, factor endowments, trade policies
and environmental energy policies and so on.  It is important to note that the impact of trade
flows on the environment can also be influenced by FDI other than the above-mentioned
factors.  The implications of FDI on the environment in Thailand will now be considered.Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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4. FDI AND ITS IMPACT ON THE ENVIRONMENT
The role of FDI has been widely recognized as a growth-enhancing factor in
developing countries.  Various studies have focused on the contribution of FDI to the
economic development of Thailand (Pupphavesa and Pussarungsri, 1994; Siamwalla and
others, 1999; Kohpaiboon, 2003).
In Thailand, the liberalization of trade and the ability to attract foreign investment
have moved hand in hand.  Foreign direct inflows of investment to Thailand boomed in the
period 1995-2000.  They increased from around $515 million during the period 1970-1975
to over $17,416 million during the period 1996-2000.  The share of FDI in gross domestic
investment (GDI), which was about 2-3 per cent in the 1980s, reached about 20 per cent in
2000.  Further, over the years the share of total FDI entered mainly the manufacturing
sector.
An important proportion of FDI has been from OECD countries (about 67.8 per
cent in 1987, increasing to almost 75.7 per cent in 2000).  The major receiving sector of
OECD investment has been industry, the share of which increased from 52.7 per cent in
1990 to 62.6 per cent in 2000 (table 6).  Electrical and electronic appliances, machinery and
chemicals deserve mention.  Japan was the major player in FDI in Thailand in the years
prior to the crisis.  Throughout the 1990s major investment from Japan was in electrical
appliances, machinery and transport equipment.  Along with Japan, the United States and
the European Union have also been important sources of FDI.  The attractions of investing
in Thailand were varied:  macroeconomic stability, rapid expansion of the domestic market
(GNP growth of more than 6 per cent per annum during the period 1985-1995) and low
labour cost, which provided a platform for exports and devaluation of the baht in 1984.
There has been migration of dirty industries to Thailand from developed countries such as
Japan.  The appreciation of the Japanese yen resulted in relocation of production bases from
Japan to Thailand in order to take advantage of the comparative advantage of Thailand.
FDI was predominant in import-substitution industries in the late 1970s.
However, an increasing share of FDI was directed to more export-oriented activities, with
a shift towards the manufacturing sector in the late 1980s and 1990s.  The earlier analysis
(section 4) clearly indicated that there has been a dramatic change in the composition of
exports from agro-based ones to manufactures over the period 1980 to 2000.  FDI played an
important role in this shift.
What has been the effect of FDI on the environment? As is the case for trade, the
environmental effects of FDI can be positive or negative.  FDI helped to spur Thailand’s
competitiveness in international trade.  The increase in competition for goods has prompted
investors from high-cost production countries to relocate their production to low-cost
countries.  This relocation trend contributed not only to the structural development of the
manufacturing sector in Thailand but also has an impact on the environment.Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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To assess the impact, the pollution content of FDI from OECD countries was
computed following equation 11 in the technical appendix for the year 2000.  The results
are 428.49 tons of carbon, 3.54 tons of sulphur and 4.07 tons of nitrogen oxides for carbon
dioxide, sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxides, respectively.
Moreover, FDI can be treated as an input in the economy for enhancing its
productive capacity.  This in turn has influenced the export performance of the economy
and generated pollution.  This has been modelled in equation 4*.  Computations show that
the pollution content of exports fuelled by FDI were 343.14 tons of carbon for carbon
dioxide, 3.09 tons of sulphur for sulphur dioxide and 3.06 tons of nitrogen oxides for
nitrogen oxides during 2000.  These values clearly indicate the contribution of FDI (more
than 80 per cent) to the generation of pollution from the export sectors.
Table 6. Share of net inflow of FDI from OECD countries among sectors
(Percentage)
Sectors 1987 1990 1995 2000
1. Financial institutions 8.70 5.62 0.34 7.96
2. Trade 17.26 16.12 23.13 10.91
3. Construction 12.68 6.47 1.94 0.77
4. Mining and quarrying 3.08 1.62 2.87 0.15
5. Agriculture 2.86 1.45 0.74 0.02
6. Industry 45.94 52.72 58.64 62.64
6.1 Food 2.21 2.95 1.27 1.05
6.2 Textiles 4.97 1.75 3.46 0.65
6.3 Metal-based and non-metallic 9.83 6.41 5.95 6.27
6.4 Electrical appliances 11.80 20.78 24.12 16.22
6.5 Machinery and transport equipment 2.06 5.65 9.02 20.34
6.6 Chemicals 8.63 7.04 5.28 13.95
6.7 Petroleum products 0.01 2.43 5.32 0.01
6.8 Construction materials 0.08 0.02 0.17 1.44
6.9 Other industry 6.35 5.68 4.05 2.70
7. Services 6.25 3.08 2.68 4.63
8. Investment 0.00 0.00 0.88 0.39
9. Real estate 3.22 11.81 8.78 1.33
10. Others 0.00 1.11 0.01 11.21
Total 100 100 100 100
Source: Computed by the author from the published and unpublished data of the Bank of Thailand.Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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Thus, the above discussion shows that the environmental implication of FDI
from OECD countries in Thailand has not been favourable.  On the other hand, the rapidly
growing economies of Asia, such as China and Malaysia, have been successful in attracting
FDI flows during the 1990s and these have had no negative impacts on the environment
(Rock, 2002).
5. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The complex interrelationship between trade and the environment has become
a focal point for international as well as national policymakers.  With this in mind, the
current research has assessed the impact on the environment of Thailand’s trade with OECD
countries during the period 1980-2000, focusing on the contradictory hypotheses, i.e., the
pollution haven and factor endowment hypotheses.  The environmental indicators for this
work concentrate only on air pollution (emissions of carbon dioxide, sulphur dioxide and
nitrogen dioxides) from fossil fuel combustion.  It measures Thailand’s environmental gains
or losses from trade with OECD countries.
The findings of the study emphasize two aspects, i.e., why a pollution haven
matters for Thailand and factor endowment does not.  The analysis of the effect of FDI on
the environment has demonstrated that, although the role of FDI helped to promote exports
for Thailand, it has not been environmentally friendly.  These effects have been caused
primarily by the shift in the trade policy, from exports of agricultural products to
manufactures, lax environmental regulations with ineffective implementation and the
increased capital intensity of exports.
The current findings can be compared with those of other studies.  The results are
in line with those of Low and Yeats (1992) and Waldkirch and Gopinath (2004), but
contradict those of Busse (2004) and Mukhopadhyay and Chakraborty (2005a and 2005b).
On the other hand, Mani and Wheeler (1998), Cole and Elliott (2001), Copeland and Taylor
(2003) provide mixed results.  Our findings provide stronger evidence concerning the two
hypotheses and thus are thought-provocative.
The current study has important implications for other developing countries in the
region.  For example, China, Malaysia and the Philippines, which are also following
a similar export-driven growth path induced by FDI, would likely be enduring similar types
of environmental impacts.  Although these countries may have stricter environmental
regulations compared with those of Thailand, they are far below OECD standards.  Thus,
the possibility of these countries being pollution havens cannot be ruled out.  However,
determination of such a status would require a thorough investigation.
From this study several policies involving trade and the environment can be
suggested.  The Government of Thailand should put proper emphasis on the environmentalAsia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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quality of exported goods that will create sustainable trade in the future, as the country’s
economy is now highly dependent on exports.  “Greener” trade should be given preference
continuously by the Government.
(a) Instead of too much emphasis on the export of capital-intensive goods,
a balanced export strategy combining labour- and capital-intensive goods
could be considered;
(b) To maintain environmental quality the Thai Government should adopt
trade-restricting measures for pollution-intensive export goods:  (i) to achieve
this, implementation of taxes or tariffs based on the environmental impact of
the production of the goods, known as eco-duties, may be considered;
(ii) instead of command-and-control policy, economic instruments (for example,
fuel user charges, emission charges and pollution management fees) might be
applied in order to manage industrial air pollution.  An energy tax based on
the estimated consumption of energy during the production of goods might be
levied as another policy option;
(c) Technological improvements in producing “green” products would require
greater expenditures on research and development.  For that the Government
could provide financial incentives in the form of tax rebates/exemptions for
the firms.  In this context, the Government could also consider providing
subsidies for the users of imported technology necessary for the production of
so-called green products;
(d) A large number of small and medium-sized enterprises involved in export
activities are less interested in developing and procuring new technologies
that have the least adverse impact on the environment.  The Government
should take the initiative in promoting research and development of
technologies and management techniques suitable for small and medium-
sized enterprises;
(e) Last but not least, the Government of Thailand should adopt a more proactive
stance concerning foreign environmental regulations affecting Thai
producers.  Stricter standards are in the offing, so early action by the
Government would be helpful to Thai firms to enable them to adjust to
external regulations.
Thus, the study suggests that the Government of Thailand should integrate both
trade and environmental policies in a coherent manner (trade-related environmental
measures and environment-related trade measures) in order to realize gains from trade while
protecting the environment.Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
40
REFERENCES
Antweiler, W. (1996).  “The pollution terms of trade”, Economic Systems Research, vol. 8,
No. 4, pp. 361-365.
Bank of Thailand.  Annual Report (various issues).
Busse, M. (2004).  Trade, Environmental Regulations and the World Trade Organization:
New Empirical Evidence, World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper 3361, July.
Cole, M.A. and R.J.R. Elliott (2001).  Factor Endowments or Environmental Regulations?
Determining the Trade-Environment Composition Effect, Discussion Paper 01-06,
(Birmingham, University of Birmingham, Department of Economics).
Copeland B.R. and M.S. Taylor (2003).  Trade and the Environment: Theory and Evidence
(Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press).
______ (2004).  “Trade, growth and the environment”, Journal of Economic Literature,
vol. 42, No. 1, pp. 1-128.
Department of Alternative Energy Development and Efficiency (1980). Thailand Energy
Situation in 1980 (Bangkok, Ministry of Energy).
______ (1990).  Thailand Energy Situation in 1990 (Bangkok, Ministry of Energy).
______ (2000).  Thailand Energy Situation in 2000 (Bangkok, Ministry of Energy).
Eskeland, G.S. and A.E. Harrison (2003).  “Moving to greener pastures? Multinationals
and pollution haven hypothesis”, Journal of Development Economics, vol. 70, No. 1,
pp. 1-23.
Gale, I.V. and R. Lewis (1995).  “Trade liberalization and pollution: an input-output study
of carbon dioxide emissions in Mexico”, Economic Systems Research, vol. 7, No. 3,
pp. 309-320.
International Monetary Fund (various years).  International Financial Statistics
(Washington, D.C.).
Javorcik, Beata S. and Shang-Jin Wei (2004).  “Pollution havens and foreign direct
investment: dirty secret or popular myth?”, Contributions to Economic Analysis &
Policy, vol. 3, No. 2 (Berkeley, California, The Berkeley Electronic Press), Article 8.
Jha, Veena, A. Markandya and R. Vossenaar (1999).  Reconciling Trade and Environment:
Lessons from Case Studies in Developing Countries, Trade Environment and
Development Section, UNCTAD (Cheltenham, United Kingdom, Edward Elgar
Publishing Company).
Kohpaiboon, A. (2003).  “Foreign trade regimes and the FDI-growth nexus: a case study of
Thailand”, The Journal of Development Studies, vol. 40, No. 2, pp. 55-69.Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
41
Leontief, W. (1951).  The Structure of the American Economy, 1919-1939, second edition,
(New York, Oxford University Press).
Low, P. and A. Yeats (1992).  “Do dirty industries migrate?”, in P. Low, ed., International
Trade and the Environment, World Bank Discussion Paper No. 159, (Washington,
D.C., World Bank), pp. 89-104.
Lucas, R., D. Wheeler and H. Hettige (1992).  “Economic development, environmental
regulation, and international migration of toxic industrial pollution: 1960-1988”, in
P. Low, ed., International Trade and the Environment, World Bank Discussion Paper
No. 159 (Washington, D.C., World Bank), pp. 67-88.
Machado. G., R. Schaeffer and E. Worrell (2001).  “Energy and carbon embodied in the
international trade of Brazil: an input-output approach”, Ecological Economics,
vol. 39, No. 3, pp. 409-424.
Mani, M. and D. Wheeler (1998).  “In search of pollution havens? Dirty industry in the
world economy, 1960-1995”, Journal of Environment and Development, vol. 7,
No. 3, pp. 215-247.
Mukhopadhyay, K. and D. Chakraborty (2005a).  “Environmental impacts of trade in
India”, International Trade Journal, vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 135-163.
______ (2005b).  “Is free trade good for the environment? Evidence from India,” Asia
Pacific Development Journal, vol. 12, No. 1, pp. 109-136.
Munksgaard, J. and K.A. Pedersen (2001).  “CO2 accounts for open economies: producer or
consumer responsibility?”, Energy Policy, vol. 29, No. 4, pp. 327-335.
National Economic and Social Development Board (1984).  Input-Output Tables of
Thailand for the Year 1980 (Bangkok, Office of the Prime Minister).
______ (1994).  Input-Output Tables of Thailand for the Year 1990 (Bangkok, Office of the
Prime Minister).
______ (2002).  Capital Stock of Thailand (Bangkok, Office of the Prime Minister).
______ (2003).  National Income of Thailand, 1980-2001 edition (Bangkok, Office of the
Prime Minister).
______ (2004).  Input-Output Tables of Thailand for the Year 2000 (Bangkok, Office of the
Prime Minister).
National Statistical Office (1981).  Report of the Labour Force Survey, Whole Kingdom
(Bangkok, Office of the Prime Minister).
______ (1981).  Report of the Manufacturing Industry Survey, Whole Kingdom, (Bangkok,
Office of the Prime Minister).
______ (1991).  Report of the Labour Force Survey, Whole Kingdom (Bangkok, Office of
the Prime Minister).Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
42
______ (1991).  Report of the Manufacturing Industry Survey, Whole Kingdom, (Bangkok,
Office of the Prime Minister).
______ (2001).  Report of the Labour Force Survey, Whole Kingdom (Bangkok, Office of
the Prime Minister).
______ (2001).  Report of the Manufacturing Industry Survey, Whole Kingdom, (Bangkok,
Office of the Prime Minister).
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (1986).  Foreign Trade
by Commodities, Export and Import, vols. I and II (Paris).
______(1992).  Foreign Trade by Commodities 1990, volume 5, (Paris).
______(2002).  Foreign Trade by Commodities 1996/2001, volume 5, (Paris).
Phongpaichit, P. and C. Baker (2002).  Thailand Economy and Politics, second edition
(New York, Oxford University Press).
Proops, J.L., G. Atkinson, B.F.V. Schlotheim and S. Simon (1999).  “International trade and
the sustainability footprint: a practical criterion for its assessment”, Ecological
Economics, vol. 28, No. 1, pp. 75-79.
Pupphavesa, Wisarn and Bunluasak Pussarungsri (1994).  FDI in Thailand (Bangkok,
Thailand Development Research Institutet), April.
Rock, M.T. (2002).  Pollution Control in East Asia: Lessons from Newly Industrializing
Economies (Washington, D.C., Resources for the Future).
Siamwalla, Ammar, Yos Vajragupta and Pakorn Vichyanond (1999).  Foreign Capital Flows
to Thailand: Determinants and Impact (Bangkok, Thailand Development Research
Institute), November.
Thailand Development Research Institute (TDRI) (1996).  Environmental Strategy for
Thailand, Natural Resources and Environment Program (Bangkok), September.
_____ (2000).  The State of Environment in Thailand: A Decade of Change, Mingsarn
Kaosa-ard and P. Wijukprasert, eds., Natural Resources and Environment Program
(Bangkok).
Thailand Environment Institute (TEI) (2000).  The Compatibility of International Trade and
Environmental Regulation: Implications for Thailand and Other Developing
Nations, TEI Report (Bangkok) April.
Tobey, J.A. (1990).  “The effects of domestic environmental policies”, Kyklos, vol. 43,
No. 2, pp. 191-209.
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) (1994).  The Inter-linkages between Trade and
Environment (Geneva, UNCTAD), June.Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
43
Waldkirch, A. and M. Gopinath (2004).  “Pollution haven or hythe? New evidence from
Mexico”, International Trade, No. 0412005, Economics Working Paper Archive at
Washington University in St. Louise.
Wyckoff, A.W. and J.M. Roop (1994).  “The embodiment of carbon in imports of
manufactured products: implications for international agreements on greenhouse gas
emissions”, Energy Policy, vol. 22, No. 3, pp. 187-194.
Xing, Y. and C. Kolstad (2002).  “Do lax environmental regulations attract foreign




The methodology of the study is based on the input-output framework of Leontief
(1951).  The structure of the input-output model can be framed as follows:
X = Ad X + Y ……………(1)
or
X = (I – Ad) – 1 Y……………(1a)
Here X defines the vector of domestic output and Ad, the matrix of the domestic
input-output coefficient and [I – Ad]–1, the Leontief domestic inverse matrix.  Now the
emission model can be formulated through (1a).
Emission model
The total amount of an emission from fossil fuel combustion can be calculated as a function
of the output of industries:
Fpd = CL1Xd = C L1 (I – Ad)-1 Y……………(2)
Here Fpd is a scalar giving the total quantity of an emission from fossil fuel
combustion.  The emissions in this study are carbon dioxide, sulphur dioxide and nitrogen
oxides, defined as pollution type p.  In equation (2) CL1 carries only direct and C L1
(I – Ad)-1 gives the direct as well as indirect requirement of pollution from industries.
Let CL1 = S and (I – Ad)-1 = R.  Then equation (2) will be
Fpd = SRd Y……………(2a)
Pollution Haven Hypothesis
To establish a link between trade and environment, the trade model is developed
by extending the equation (2a).
Trade model
Separating the final demand vector as domestic demand (Yd) and net exports,
we obtain
Y= Yd + Yx –Ym……………(3)Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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Where Yx (nx1) and Ym (nx1) are the vectors of exports and imports respectively.
Here we assume identical technology (Heckscher-Ohlin) to determine the pollution content
of imports from OECD countries.  Thus, the pollution content of exports and imports can be
defined as follows:
Fpd expoecd = SR Yxoecd ……………(4)
Fpd impoecd = SR Ymoecd……………(5)
Equations (4) and (5) are scalar, giving different pollution content of exports and
imports.  A measure of pollution terms of trade (PTOT) for Thailand with OECD
countries is derived by equations (4) and (5) as
PTOTpd oecd = Fpd expoecd / Fpd impoecd = [SRYxoecd] / [SRYmoecd]……………(6)
This measure (equation 6) of pollution terms of trade indicates the ratio of the
pollution content of 1 unit of exports relative to the pollution content of 1 unit of imports.
A country gains environmentally from trade in relative terms whenever its imported goods
have higher pollution content than its exported goods.  When the pollution terms of trade
are greater (smaller) than 100, then a particular country’s exports contain more (less)
pollution than it is receiving through imports.  The expression of (6) provides the
compositional effect.  This indicator has been used to reflect the pollution haven effect.
The explanation of the pollution haven hypothesis will be stronger if the factor
endowment hypothesis is discussed in this context, as it offers another view of the impact of
international trade on the allocation of environmental burdens across countries.
Factor Endowment Hypothesis
The Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek model, which focuses on the relationship between
production factors and trade, predicts that a country exports services of the factors that are
relatively abundant in the country and imports services of the factors that are relatively
scarce in the country.  To estimate the total labour and capital requirements in exports and
imports, equation (2a) has been modified as shown in equations (7-10).




Where, L and K symbols indicate sectoral labour and capital coefficients,
respectively.Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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The factor endowment hypothesis holds that a labour-rich country exports
labour-intensive goods and imports capital-intensive goods.  This can be indicated by the
ratio of capital requirements of imports and exports, which will be greater than 1, but will
be less than 1 for a capital-abundant country.
Foreign Direct Investment Model
Equation (2a) has been further modified (equation 11) to calculate the pollution
content of FDI.
Fpd fdi = SR Yfdi (oecd)……………(11)
Where Yfdi (oecd) explains FDI from OECD countries.
The model has further investigated how far FDI has induced exports and, in turn,
pollution.  For that FDI has been treated as an input into the economic activity of Thailand.
The pollution content of exports due to FDI has been derived as follows:
Fpd
exp
(fdi) = S R* Yxoecd …………… (4*)
Where R* denotes (1 – Ad*)-1 and Ad* defines the input-output coefficient matrix,
including FDI as an input.
The data sources used for the application of the model are:  (a) input-output table
of Thailand for the years 1980, 1990 and 2000 (NESDB, 1984, 1994 and 2004); (b) energy
consumption data for Thailand for the years 1980, 1990 and 2000 (Department of Energy
Development Programme); (c) data on trade with OECD countries for the years 1980, 1990
and 2000 (OECD, 1986; OECD, 1992; and OECD, 2002); (d) international financial
statistics for exchange rates (IMF, various years); (e) labour and capital stock data at the
sectoral level from the Report of the Labour Force Survey, Whole Kingdom and Report of
the Manufacturing Industry Survey, Whole Kingdom (National Statistical Office of
Thailand, various years) and Capital Stock of Thailand (NESDB, 2002); and (f) data on
foreign direct investment from published and unpublished sources (Bank of Thailand,
various years).Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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ABSTRACT
T
his paper discusses, from a developing country’s perspective, the impact
and implications of the Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property
Rights of the World Trade Organization (WTO).  It does so by putting them into the
context of relevant trends of globalization and assessing the political and institutional
setting within the WTO framework.  The paper thereby provides comprehensive
background information on trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights
(TRIPs) and the resulting international intellectual property regime, including its
characteristics, preconditions, the actors and interests involved, and it provides an
institutional analysis.  The main finding is that the constraints on intellectual property
regulation in developing countries are twofold.  First, the TRIPs Agreement has an
unprecedented impact on national regulations by imposing global minimum standards
for types of intellectual property protection, the scope and the duration of those
regulations along with rules for enforcement.  Second, the emergence of the TRIPs
Agreement has made intellectual property protection an important issue in today’s
global production networks established by transnational corporations.  Therefore, in
the case of intellectual property protection, the continuous internationalization of
production and the knowledge-based economy (as major trends in today’s global
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economy) has become the fundamental driver for increased attention to national
regulation in developing countries owing to increased technological competition and
investment in research and development.  However, when analysing the emergence
and impacts of the TRIPs Agreement, both economic and political integration
appear to be deeply interlinked.  Mounting exports and investment flows from
the industrialized countries confronted their Governments with the demand for
cross-border enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPRs).  The weak and
fragmented World Intellectual Property Organization system was thus bypassed by
introducing the IPR issue into the talks under the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, which offered the best institutional platform to push intellectual property
protection forward, because industrialized countries could offer rewards quid pro quo
for the commitments made by developing countries.  The specific characteristics of
the established international intellectual property regime within the WTO framework
made its global impact feasible, since WTO offers widespread membership and the
option to enforce compliance through its Dispute Settlement Body.  On the other
hand, besides national intellectual property systems, the TRIPs Agreement also
changed the global trade and investment environment fundamentally with regard to
the strengthening of owner rights on inventions and innovation.  As the outlined
trend of internationalization of research and development indicates, the paper assumes
that the TRIPs Agreement facilitates further fragmentation of production in
technology-intensive sectors and hence offers further opportunities for potential host
countries, because adjusted intellectual property systems and better prospects for
enforcement may generally encourage transnational corporations to relocate the very
intellectual property-sensitive parts of production.  Throughout the paper basic
theoretical concepts are discussed in order to clarify the actual developments, and
illustrative examples are used, such as the internationalization of research and
development and the unilateral and bilateral efforts of the United States for cross-border
enforcement of IPRs.
1. INTRODUCTION
Since the Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights came into
force in 1995, the protection of intellectual property has become an issue of specific
attention from a developing country’s perspective.  Until then, national intellectual property
regulation was often subject to strategic industrialization policies aimed at facilitating
imitation, or it was of no concern at all.  This situation has changed with the TRIPs
Agreement.Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
49
The developed countries first pushed for strengthening IPRs in the Tokyo round of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), because they increasingly perceived
that enforcement was inadequate and obviously looked for another forum to solve the
problem besides the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).  Industrialized
countries wanted to find a solution, because strong domestic interests within the exporting
industries evolved as did general concerns about the loss of research and development
(R and D) investments due to imitation in developing countries.  Governments faced
a dilemma with regard to the traditionally national coverage of intellectual property
regulation and the transnational reach of innovating industries.  Consequently, they used the
GATT platform to implement internationally enforceable rules on intellectual property
protection and to offer concessions in other areas of the Uruguay round negotiations as quid
pro quo.  Nonetheless, by accepting the TRIPs provisions, developing countries made
considerable commitments with regard to the cost of immediate implementation and
potential transfer payments to intellectual property-holding firms abroad.
The major impact of the TRIPs Agreement is the harmonization of national
intellectual property regulation with global “minimum standards in virtually all areas of
intellectual property protection” (Maskus, 2000, p. 26) including rules for enforcement and
administration in all WTO member countries.  The institutional environment of GATT and
the World Trade Organization (WTO) made this unprecedented intervention in national
regulation feasible.
This paper interlinks the globalization process, particularly the internationalization
of production and the emergence of a knowledge-based global economy, with the political
dimensions of the TRIPs Agreement within the WTO framework.  The next sections are
organized as follows:  section 2 outlines the background of IPRs and the debate, and
discusses and subsequently illustrates the internationalization of production and the
knowledge-based economy by focusing on the trend of the internationalization of R and D.
Section 3 puts the TRIPs Agreement into its political-economic context.  It analyses first the
weaknesses of the WIPO system and the political economy of cross-border IPR
enforcement; second, it points out the complex position of developing countries in the
negotiations; and third, it assesses the main characteristics and elements of the new
international intellectual property regime, which goes beyond the TRIPs Agreement.  That
regime is expanded through an increasing number of preferential bilateral and regional trade
agreements.Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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2. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND TRENDS IN THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY
(a) Regulation of intellectual property rights
The term IPRs refers to the legal instrument for protecting the ownership of an
immaterial good:  creations of the mind resulting from invention and innovation.1 An IPR,
e.g., a patent, copyright or industrial design,2 entitles the owner to capitalize exclusively on
its commercial use for a certain period.  The paper focuses on patents,3 which are
subsequently also referred to as intellectual property.  The reason is that patents are the most
relevant type of intellectual property for the creation of technology.
As a static set of rules, IPRs “are just one of the pieces that form a national system
of intellectual property protection.” (Primo Braga and others, 2000, p. 4).  Naturally, it takes
more than the sole legal status of IPRs to ensure that rights can be granted by the State.  The
lack of enforcement is often the most criticized feature of the system in developing
countries.  Especially in newly industrialized countries, the focus is on intellectual property
protection, because the production and consumption of goods and services increasingly
involves new technology, i.e., knowledge which can be commercially exploited.  Maskus
(2000, p. 3) identifies three key elements of the intellectual property system:  “standards”,
“limitations” and “enforcement”.  Standards determine the scope of the IPR.  Hence,
limitations additionally restrict the extent of protection.  They include the period of
protection, compulsory licensing to ensure the use of certain technology and competition
rules to contain monopolistic tendencies.  Enforcement comprises all “administrative and
judicial actions by public authorities to safeguard the rights granted” (Maskus, 2000, p. 3).
For all WTO members, TRIPs includes these three key elements as obligations to
implement.
Intellectual property regulation, including all components of the intellectual
property system, is conventionally a concern of national policymaking.  The Government
1 Concerning the application of IPRs, Hoekman and Kostecki (2001,  p. 276) emphasize the importance of
innovation, because it is mostly related to the commercial and “costly” part of R and D, which turns the
invention into a product.
2 According to a widely quoted categorization of IPRs in Primo Braga and others (2000, p. 4), patents are within
industrial property, the first of four “types of IPR”, and can be found in both international treaties and in some
national intellectual property provisions.  They include utility models, geographical indications, industrial
designs and trademarks.  The second type, literary and artistic property, namely copyrights and neighbouring
rights, protect the authors of printing, audio and video entertainment, software and broadcasting.  The third
type, trade secrets, refers to undisclosed business information.  The fourth type refers to sui generis protection
and includes plant breeders’ rights, database protection and integrated circuits as specific instruments of
protection not covered by other types.  All types of IPRs can be found in different agreements of the World
Intellectual Property Organization and nearly all are included in TRIPs.
3 The use of the term intellectual property refers mainly to patents.Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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intervenes in the distribution of gains arising from inventions and R and D in order to avoid
an assumed underinvestment in the “production of knowledge”, as argued by Arrow (1962,
citing Primo Braga and Fink, 1999, p. 2).  The “economic rationale” for policymakers to
provide IPRs derives from the character of knowledge, because it is “non-rival in nature”,
i.e., the marginal cost of its distribution is zero.
However, the concept of intellectual property protection has been contested,
especially after the emergence of the TRIPs Agreement.  While the proponents are worried
about the absence of incentives for innovation, which can lead to welfare losses, the critics
focus on the reduced resources for the public, i.e., higher consumer prices, which are
comparable to a tax.4 Hoekman and Kostecki (2001, p. 277) note that each Government
could choose its “optimal mix” between rent-granting and free access to knowledge for its
own territory using IPRs.  As Primo Braga and others (2000) show, the strength of
intellectual property protection mainly correlated with the level economic development in
the 1970s (figure 1).
Figure 1.  Judging the strength of protection of intellectual property rights
by the level of economic development
Source:  Primo Braga and others (2000).  Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Development,
Discussion Paper No. 412 (Washington, D.C., World Bank).
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4 With regard to developing countries, the United Kingdom-based Commission on Intellectual Property Rights
(CIPR, 2003,  p. 6) and Correa (2000) have a more critical view about Western standards of intellectual
property protection and its global implementation through the TRIPs Agreement.  Maskus (2000 and 2005) is
the most prominent scholar among proponents of, broadly speaking, strengthened intellectual property
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However, this freedom of choice is restricted nowadays owing to the introduction
of minimum standards through the TRIPs Agreement.  Imposed norms through
a multilateral regime, as discussed in the next chapter, constrain national policy options in
intellectual property regulation.  Consequently, the agreement has bolstered the debate over
IPRs.  There is a widely shared view among economists that a uniform application of
TRIPs Agreement standards and their implementation is problematic as regards the level of
economic development and institutional capacities.5
Therefore, while generally strengthened intellectual property systems in the newly
industrialized countries (NICs) of Asia could enable further success in attracting foreign
direct investment (FDI) and enhancing their own technological advance, in the case of the
least developed countries (LDCs) these measures might be inappropriate, as a study of
Hoekman and others (2004) indicates.  According to the state of development, they suggest
(see table 1) adjusted IPR strategies within a comprehensive policy package concerning
international technology transfer (see next section).
Table 1.  A “rule-of-thumb” typology and examples of international technology
transfer policies in developing countries
Trade in




 direct knowledge property
movement
technology
investment (licensing)  rights policies
Low- Liberal access Inward Improve Basic Incentives for Basic
income investment information protection and education education;
countries promotion flows about minimum abroad improve
public domain standards infrastructure;
and mature reduce entry
technologies barriers
Lower Liberal access Inward Improve Wider scope Incentives for Research and
middle investment information; of protection; education development
income promotion limited employ abroad and support




Upper Liberal access No active No active Full TRIPs Encourage Research and
middle policy policy two-way development
income mobility support
countries policies
Source: Extracted from Bernhard M. Hoekman and others (2004). Transfer of Technology to Developing
Countries: Unilateral and Multilateral Policy Options, Policy Research Working Paper No. 3332 (Washington,
D.C., World Bank), p. 32.
5 See Hoekman and Kostecki, 2001; Primo Braga and others, 2000; Hoekman and others, 2004; CIPR, 2003;
Correa, 2000.Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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(b)  Internationalization of production and knowledge-based economy
Both intellectual property regulation in general and intellectual property protection
in particular have become a matter of concern beyond national borders:  for business and
politics in industrialized countries and subsequently in developing countries.  This paper
argues that the emergence of the TRIPs Agreement and its implications for developing
countries are strongly linked to globalization.  At the same time, the TRIPs Agreement and
its global impact are also a crucial part of globalization.
Globalization is a term of wide comprehension; although it is extensively used, it
is also contested at the same time.  The view taken in this paper distinguishes between
economic and political integration in trade and finance as two major forces in the whole
process of globalization.  A general account of globalization found in the White Paper on
Globalization and Poverty (2000) produced by the Government of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland explains economic globalization and puts the political
aspects of globalization loosely beside it:
In fact, globalization means the growing interdependence and interconnectedness
of the modern world.… The increased ease of movement of goods, services,
capital, people and information across national borders is rapidly creating a single
global economy.  The process is driven by technological advance and reductions in
the cost of international transactions, which spread technology and ideas, raise the
share of trade in world production, and increase the mobility of capital.  It is also
reflected in the diffusion of global norms and values, the spread of democracy and
the proliferation of global agreements and treaties…(cited in Weiss, 2002, p. 140)
Although the definition gives a comprehensive account, it is important to
emphasize that both integration processes are intertwined with each other in the context of
the TRIPs Agreement.  Today’s state of economic globalization and foremost liberalization
can be understood only with regard to the governing multilateral institutions in trade and
finance and the involvement of national Governments (see Rodrik, 1999; Krasner, 2000).
On the other hand, most of the debate on globalization focuses on the diminishing scope for
national policymaking due to exogenous constraints and the emergence of transnational
corporations (TNCs) as transnational actors (Strange, 2000; Frieden and Rogowski, 1996).
Today’s economic globalization has introduced two trends, which are important in
order to identify the implications of the TRIPs Agreement for national intellectual property
protection in the context of economic development:  the internationalization of production
and the development of a global knowledge-based economy, which combined have led to
the internationalization of R and D.  All three trends are introduced in turn below.Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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(i) Internationalization of production
The above term describes the process of dispersion of production through arm’s
length trade, licensing6 and most importantly FDI by TNCs, which seek new markets,
resources, lower production costs and efficiency (Campos and Kinoshita, 2003, pp. 5-6).
As outlined, technology (most importantly, information and communications) and liberal
trade and investment policies have helped to reduce transaction costs and thereby have
facilitated outsourcing of parts of production by TNCs to developing countries.  FDI, i.e.,
the establishment of an affiliate abroad and the related internalization of technology
transfer, has become the most important channel of internationalization of production.  In
effect, the inflow of FDI has grown rapidly in the last two decades, especially in the ESCAP
region.  Rajan (2005, p. 5) points out that “FDI has been found the most stable source of
external finance for developing countries in the Asian and Pacific region”.
Rajan (2005, pp. 9-10) emphasizes that in developing countries the growth of the
“old”, trade-based type of “production fragmentation” in consumer goods industries, such
as garments and footwear, is outpaced by the “new”, investments-based type involving
sectors such as “airliners, computers, semiconductors, automobiles and many other
products”.  Thus, the share of production by TNC affiliates producing on a “hi-tech” level is
rising in developing countries.  This trend offers potential gains for host countries in terms
of economic growth and technology spillovers.  The role of TNCs as actors in and sources
of global trade and investment cannot be overestimated, since they account for “around
two-thirds of world trade for the latter half of the 1990s” (UNCTAD, 2002, p. 153).
(ii) The knowledge-based economy
The second characteristic of today’s economic globalization highlights
the increasing importance of knowledge in the economy and society:  the so-called
knowledge-based economy.7 The World Development Report 1998/1999 (World Bank,
(1998, pp. 6-8) argues that knowledge has become the crucial factor for development, as it
has become for the global economy with its implications for R and D expenditure:
The creation of technical knowledge – as measured by patents issued, although not
all technical knowledge patented – is expanding rapidly.  [Within only four years,
the number of patent applications worldwide increased from 1.4 million in 1989 to
6 Licensing is another important channel of technology transfer.  With reference to international technology
transfer (ITT), Hoekman and others (2004, p. 3) summarize:  “A third major channel of ITT is direct trade in
knowledge via technology licensing.  This may occur within firms, among joint ventures, or between unrelated
firms.  Licensing and FDI are often substitutes.  Which form is preferable to technology owners depends on
many factors, including the strength of IPRs protection”.
7 The term gained relevance through the OECD report entitled “The Knowledge-Based Economy” (Paris,
OECD, 1996).Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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2 million in 1993.  Continuous innovation, automation, and competition in the
creation and use of knowledge have shortened product cycles in many industries.
UNCTAD (2005, p. 99) summarizes the implications for developing countries:
Technology is advancing faster than ever before.  Developing countries that fail to
build capabilities enabling them to participate in the evolving global networks of
knowledge creation risk falling further behind in terms of competitiveness as well
as economic and social development.
As OECD (2000, p. 27) states, innovation and technological change are the key
drivers for economic growth.  OECD (2000, p. 32) also sees evidence that “more than
before, innovation is now at the core of economic activity”.  The evolution of R and D
expenditures over time support this view:  total R and D spending worldwide increased
from $438 billion in 1991 to $576 billion in 1996 to $677 billion in 2002 (UNCTAD, 2005, 
p. 105).  Private spending amounted to $449.8 billion in 2002 (UNCTAD, 2005, p. 105),
accounting for 66.5 per cent of worldwide R and D spending, and therefore it should be
considered as an important source of national R and D activities (table 2).  The share is
constantly growing in most of the OECD countries (OECD, 2000, p. 28).
The “knowledge gap” (World Bank, 1998) or “technology gap” (UNCTAD, 2005)
is still of concern for researchers, because the geographic concentration of R and D remains
pronounced (table 2).  In this regard, TNCs, mainly from the industrialized countries, can
form the missing link for improved accession to the increasing global production and
private financing of R and D, as argued below.
International technology transfer again gained attention among researchers and
policymakers with introduction of the TRIPs Agreement, since the approach focuses on all
relevant policies that enhance the ability of a developing country to absorb foreign
technology, including intellectual property protection (see Hoekman and others, 2004;
Primo Braga and Fink, 1999).  In the post-TRIPs Agreement debate, studies focused on
imitation as a channel of transfer, which nevertheless basically ceased to exist as a policy
option with the full implementation of the TRIPs Agreement (see Davis, 2005, p. 7).
In the age of globalization, FDI, trade and licensing nowadays form legitimate and
growing options for having a stake in the global network involving foreign technology.
National policies that take a proactive approach may provide opportunities for countries to
benefit from an integrated global economy.  In contrast, a defensive approach to the new
constraints in national intellectual property regulation may lead to losses of national
welfare, for example, in terms of (potential) investments and constrained accession to
foreign high-technology goods, such as pharmaceuticals.  The sole implementation of the
TRIPs Agreement without using “wiggle room” (Holmes, 2004,  p. 27) and tailoring
regulation to domestic conditions as well as the lack of adaptation to the new global
standards and insufficient enforcement may have unfavourable effects.Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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(iii) Internationalization of R and D
The  World Investment Report:  Transnational Corporations and the Inter-
nationalization of R&D (UNCTAD, 2005) investigates a relatively new development, which
can be interpreted as a result of both of the previously outlined trends of economic
globalization:  the so-called internationalization of R and D.  It highlights an outstanding
new opportunity for developing countries, primarily NICs, to participate in the global
creation of knowledge and technological progress.  It can be interpreted as the final step of
the internationalization and geographic fragmentation of production, because it is a very
sensible part of economic activity with vital investments at stake involving highly skilled
personnel.  Furthermore, it emphasizes both the importance of TNCs as sources of foreign
Table 2.  Home economies of the 700 largest research and development-spending firms
of the world, 2003; and research and development spending, 2002








Rank research and Economy research and
development development
spenders
1 296 42.3 United States 276.2 194.4
2 154 22.0 Japan 133.0 92.3
3 53 7.6 Germany 50.2 34.8
4 39 5.6 United Kingdom 29.3 19.6
5 35 5.0 France 32.5 20.6
6 20 2.9 Switzerland n.a. n.a.
7 15 2.1 Sweden 9.4 7.3
8 10 1.4 Republic of Korea 13.8 10.4
9 8 1.1 Denmark n.a. n.a.
10 8 1.1 Taiwan Province 6.5 4.0
of China
…
22 2 0.3 China 15.6 9.5
…
28 1 0.1 Hong Kong, China 1.0 0.3
…
700 100.0 Total/ World 676.5 449.8
Source: Extracted from UNCTAD (2005). World Investment Report 2005:  Transnational Corporations
and the Internationalization of R&D (New York and Geneva), pp. 105 and 121.Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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capital and technology as well as connectors to the “global technology and innovation
networks led by these firms” (UNCTAD, 2005, p. 99).
The report (UNCTAD, 2005, p. 99) explains that, in relation to the fast-proceeding
offshoring of services in the past few years, R and D is evolving from the “least
internationalized function[s] of TNCs” to the fastest fragmenting function, such as in the
case of German TNCs, which invested more abroad in the 1990s than in the preceding
50 years (table 3).
Table 3. German research and development-related FDI abroad, 1995-2003
Year
FDI stock in research and Employment of research
development foreign Number of research and and development
affiliates abroad development foreign foreign affiliates
(Millions of affiliates (Thousands of
United States dollars) United States dollars)
1995 43.2 20 2
1996 83.8 25 2
1997 133.8 31 3
1998 199.6 55 5
1999 467.7 59 6
2000 647.7 89 9
2001 630.0 105 10
2002 934.3 73 11
2003 891.4 78 11
Source: UNCTAD (2005). World Investment Report 2005: Transnational Corporations and the
Internationalization of R&D (New York and Geneva), p. 124.
In general, R and D activities in developing countries emerge now from simple
adaptation processes to research, whereas TNCs are seeking “access to foreign pools of
research talents” (UNCTAD, 2005,  p. 99).  This global development is fastest in Asia
(UNCTAD, 2005, p. 100).  As Weiss (2002, p. 131) points out, Singapore was successful in
adopting a proactive strategy, which combines tax incentives and direct grants for R and D
with the “provision of a high technology infrastructure based on public sector research
institutes and universities”.  Nowadays, 50 per cent of Singapore’s R and D is conducted by
foreign affiliates (UNCTAD, 2005, p. 125).  Regarding the intellectual property system and
the rule of law, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, former Prime Minister of Singapore, emphasized the
strategy of his country in an interview with a German news magazine,8 noting that
Singapore offers an advanced legal system with effective courts and strong protection of
intellectual property in order to attract investors from technology-sensitive firms, especially
in the pharmaceutical industry.
8 “Es ist dumm, Angst zu haben”, Der Spiegel, No. 32, 2005, pp. 89-91.Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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UNCTAD (2005, pp. 99, 102) has emphasized that R and D can be found at the
peak of the so-called pyramid of innovation.  Thus, it embodies FDI with the most value
added in terms of technological spillovers.  However, it requires ambitious host-country
features, among which “stable and efficient legal and governance systems” should be
included (UNCTAD, 2005, p. 116).  UNCTAD data (2005, p. 125) from 1993 to 2002 show
that “R&D expenditure of foreign affiliates in host countries worldwide” has risen from
$29 billion or 10 per cent of global business R and D to $67 billion, or 16 per cent.  The
outlined trend draws attention again to general reasoning on factors attracting FDI.
Concerning intellectual property protection, UNCTAD (2005, p. 165) concludes:
The design of IPR regimes [national intellectual property systems] may play a less
direct but nevertheless important role.  For instance, providing effective means of
IPR protection may act as a signaling device to international investors.
Strengthening the regime may show that the country is willing to “play by the
rules” and provide a hospitable investment climate.
3. THE EMERGENCE OF THE TRIPs AGREEMENT:  TOWARDS
A GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME
(a) The WIPO system and unilateral pressure:  the emergence of
cross-border intellectual property protection
This section takes a look at the historical preconditions of the TRIPs Agreement
regime and outlines its weaknesses.  It thereby stresses the political economy of cross-border
intellectual property protection and the domestic interests involved, and it outlines the
related unilateral and bilateral attempts by industrialized countries to enforce IPRs
internationally.
When IPRs were included in the Uruguay round in 1986, intellectual property
protection had already been of international concern for over 100 years.  In the late
nineteenth century, the newly industrialized countries in Europe and the United States had
already been working for decades with national patent systems.  At this time, the “ability to
tailor the nature of their regimes [intellectual property systems] to their own circumstances
was unconstrained” as the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights (2003,  p.18)
emphasizes.  Owing to their territorial character, the recognition of IPRs of non-nationals,
i.e., importers, became an issue with the increasing level of international trade, because
intellectual property protection was mainly part of strategic discrimination and
protectionism.  When trade rose sharply because of the industrial revolution in Europe and
the United States, the profits of the exporting industries, which had prosperous sales abroad
due to their technological advances, were at stake.Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
59
Consequently, the first international agreements introduced national treatment as
the first step to ensure the same rights for foreign and domestic right holders (Scotchmer,
2004, p. 419).  The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, from its
adoption on 20 March 1883, covered patents and trademarks.  The Berne Convention for
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, from its adoption on 9 September 1886, dealt
with copyrights and neighbouring rights.  Their attempts to harmonize and to constrain
national regulations were rather limited (Scotchmer, 2004,  p. 419).  In addition, their
membership did not exceed 20 members until the 1940s (Primo Braga and others, 2000, 
p. 11).
Since 1974, WIPO9 administered the growing number of multilateral conventions
and treaties.  According to the changing circumstances of international trade and
investment, WIPO provided a strengthened forum for the evolving system, including
step-by-step new IPRs or changed provisions resulting from new agreements.  The
membership of the revised Paris and Berne conventions grew to over 120 members up to
the 1980s (Primo Braga and others, 2000,  p.  11).  However, the system still had
shortcomings compared with the TRIPs Agreement:  first, each country had the choice of
which agreement of the WIPO system to join; second, for the members, the length of patent
protection and the exclusion of certain fields of technology were discretionary; and third,
institutional enforcement mechanisms in WIPO were weak.
In the 1980s, industrialized countries started to perceive that “inadequate
enforcement of IPRs in importing countries” was reducing “the competitive advantage of
their exporting firms” (Hoekman and Kostecki, 2001,  p. 277).  As previously outlined,
global economic integration in terms of rising trade and investment along with the growing
importance of technology-intensive goods and innovation are the drivers for the
strengthening of cross-border intellectual property protection because of the objections of
the technology-exporting industries, mainly in industrialized economies, against the
existing international system.  Primo Braga (1996, p. 359) noted a “broad consensus” in the
literature that “the economic interests involved are significant”.
It is argued that the owners of IPRs in the developed countries, such as
pharmaceutical companies or the software industry, pushed their political interest
domestically, because they “wished to exploit their technical advantages on an international
scale and also to limit expropriation costs from potential rivals” (Maskus, 2000, pp. 83, 78-79;
Correa, 2000, p. 5).  As previously mentioned, national intellectual property regulation is
theoretically created to ensure innovation by allocating the privilege of monopoly to the
producers of knowledge at the expense of the consumers.  Two rather symmetrical interests
can also be found in the domestic political arena regarding cross-border intellectual
9 Founded in 1970, WIPO became a specialized United Nations agency in 1974 and it is a successor of the
United International Bureaux for the Protection of Intellectual Property, which was the international body for
overseeing the above-mentioned treaties on IPRs from the nineteenth century.Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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property protection:  on the one hand, exporting industries of medium- and high-technology
goods want to capture profit abroad, and on the other, consumers are interested in fair
competition in the domestic market between foreign and domestic technology for high
quality and low prices (see Scotchmer, 2004, p. 415).  With a focus on the innovating export
industry and following the outlined economic rationale, it appears that Governments of
industrialized countries have to “transnationalize” intellectual property protection at the
expense of developing countries in order to secure the domestic production of knowledge.
Therefore, the traditional scope of intellectual property regulation within national borders
poses a dilemma to industrialized countries.
As shown, complementary to the influence of globalization on domestic policy
choices, the domestic arena of policymaking shapes the negotiating position of
industrialized countries and their unilateral and bilateral diplomacy with regard to
intellectual property protection.  While some texts tend to stress the direct influence of
interest groups on the TRIPs negotiation outcome, i.e., that captured by business interests.
With regard to the dilemma of governing IPRs, Scotchmer (2004, p.  416) offers an
explanation from a game-theoretical perspective, which emphasizes that cross-border IPR
enforcement is the prevailing national interest:
Capture is undoubtedly an important phenomenon, but I argue that intellectual
property policies can become overprotective even if trade negotiators are equally
concerned with all domestic interests, those of both consumers and producers.
This is because intellectual property is a tool by which cross-border externalities
can be recaptured by the innovating country.
The Government of the United States, the most prominent and activist among the
industrialized countries (Hoekman and Kostecki, 2001,  p. 277), already had unilateral
instruments10 in place since the 1970s to force its trade partners to recognize its standards
of intellectual property protection, among which were import restrictions and other
sanctions against foreign Governments by the Office of the United States Trade
Representative (USTR).  Among the targets of unilateral actions were Argentina, Brazil,
China, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan Province of China and Thailand (Maskus, 2000, 
p. 4).  So-called unfair practices were filed by the USTR, and identified “prior” targets were
informed of deadlines for the removal of those practices.  For instance, tariffs on a strategic
selection of imported goods would be imposed if there was no response from the targeted
country.  The application use was so widespread that Canada, the European Community and
Brazil even filed complaints under the GATT dispute settlement mechanism concerning the
10 First, Section 337 of the 1930 United States Tariff Act was enacted by Congress to constrain imports, if
necessary; second, Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act was targeted at foreign trade partners, as amended by
the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act.  Special 301 was dedicated to intellectual property cases.
It is widely acknowledged that those laws can be ascribed to interest groups lobbying in Congress
(see Hoekman and Kostecki, 2001, pp. 277-278).Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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intellectual property-related sanctions of the United States (Hoekman and Kostecki, 2001, 
p. 279).
A second strategy was used by both the European Union and the United States:
new intellectual property laws, such as the 1996 European Union Directive on Databases,
included a condition of protection for non-nationals, under which the same law would have
to apply in the exporting country (Scotchmer, 2004,  p. 419).  A third approach is to
negotiate bilateral or regional intellectual property standards mostly in relation to free trade
agreements (FTAs), as outlined in the next section.
(b) The formation and implementation of the TRIPs Agreement:
commitments by the developing countries
IPRs were pushed on to the GATT agenda in the 1970s.  Provisions on
counterfeiting were subsequently adopted at the Tokyo round.  In 1986, the Punta del Este
Declaration acknowledged the need to clarify the Tokyo provisions (ICTSD and UNCTAD,
2003, p. 44).  In 1995, the TRIPs Agreement together with the WTO framework came into
force and established an unprecedented international regime on IPRs, because it includes
“minimum standards in virtually all areas of intellectual property protection” (Maskus,
2000,  p.  26), as well as directions for administration and enforcement for all WTO
members.
In recognition of the shortcomings of the WIPO system, Hoekman and Kostecki
(2001, p. 282) observed:  “A major attraction of the GATT was that it had an enforcement
mechanism”.  Besides the previously mentioned dispute settlement mechanism for
enforcement, GATT as a multilateral forum for trade negotiations, offered the industrialized
countries another crucial characteristic to foster the global strengthening of IPRs:  the
opportunity to offer incentives in other areas of the trade negotiations in return for the
commitments made by the developing countries.  In addition, GATT, and subsequently
WTO, also had been the best vehicle for establishing a truly global intellectual property
regime because of its ever-growing membership and the equally binding obligations of the
TRIPs Agreement for all members.11
The quid pro quo principle of trade negotiations thus offers a basis for why the
developing countries accepted such an enormous shift to a new regime, which included all
IPRs of WIPO, added new sui generis rights and imposed rules of administration and
enforcement.  A report of the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development
(ICTSD) and UNCTAD (2003, p. 44) highlights the contradiction:  in 1989, when resistance
to a substantial agreement on IPRs was dropped, some developing countries had just
enabled reforms of their patent systems to facilitate imitation.
11 Except for the time of implementation:  industrialized countries had 1 year, the developing countries and
economies in transition had 5 years, and the least developed countries had 11 years.  Formally, full
implementation of the TRIPs Agreement had to be completed by 2005 at the latest.Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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The trade-off between different parts of the Uruguay Round “package deal” made
the TRIPs Agreement possible.  Developing countries hoped that the whole package
“would outweigh the economic and social costs” (ICTSD and UNCTAD, 2003,  p. 44).
Besides the removal of some of protectionist policies, such as in agriculture, substantial
commitments were made by industrialized countries concerning the phase-out of the
Multifibre Arrangement and the ban on voluntary export restraints.  Nevertheless, the
developing countries feared also that a refusal might lead to “unilateral arm-twisting” by the
United States and the European Union (Hoekman and Kostecki, 2001,  p. 280), as had
already been experienced by some countries previously.
Some argue that the commitments of developing countries to reform their
intellectual property system saw hardly any compensation (Correa, 2000, p. 3; CIPR, 2003, 
p. 8).  However, ICTSD and UNCTAD (2003,  p. 45) noted that they still achieved
compromises in the TRIPs Agreement extending the transition periods, the scope for
national interpretation and a number of exclusions disliked by some TNCs and interest
groups.  Besides, domestic business interests existed also in oppositional countries, which
endorsed the steps forward, especially those in emerging economies that depended on FDI
or licensing for technology (Hoekman and Kostecki, 2001, p. 280).
Nonetheless, the number of trade and patent applications indicates where
international intellectual property-related payments go:  Correa (2000, p. 5) for example,
refers to patent statistics in the United States, whereas in the period between 1977 and 1996
only 10 industrialized countries accounted for 95 per cent of the applications, but
developing countries accounted for less than 2 per cent of them.  Export numbers point to
the same situation:  the so-called Asian Tigers and Latin American countries together
accounted for 11 per cent of medium- and high-technology goods exported to the OECD
countries compared with 50.6 per cent of the countries in the Group of Seven (Correa,
2000, p. 5).  Maskus (2005, p. 45) stated:  “The United States remained, by far, the largest
recipient of such fees [related to licensing of patents, copyrights, etc.], earning a net $20.7
billion in 1995”.
(c) TRIPs Agreement as an international regime and its global impact
Theories of international relations offer useful insights in understanding the nature
of the new international intellectual property system and pointing out the impact of the
TRIPs Agreement.  As a multilateral agreement within the WTO context, the TRIPs
Agreement established a new regime for intellectual property protection.  The term
“regime” refers to a theoretical concept first coined by Krasner (1983, p. 2), who identified
international regimes as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision
making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of
international relations”.  Krasner (1983, pp. 4-5) illustrated his theory with reference to
GATT.  While GATT principles are based on liberal theoretical foundations, i.e., free tradeAsia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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as the raison d’être, their norms reflect standards of behaviour for the cooperating parties,
such as reciprocity and national treatment.  The rules work basically as norms on a less
general level; sometimes they mediate between conflicting principles and norms.12
The TRIPs Agreement represents one part of the trade regime established by
WTO.  Insufficient intellectual property protection was implicitly redefined as protectionist
behaviour, therefore conflicting with the free-trade principle of GATT/WTO.  However,
unlike the provisions on tariff and non-tariff barriers, the agreement establishes rules
directly governing national regulations on IPRs by specifying the rights, the duration and
the standards for enforcement and administration.  The underlying norm is national
treatment, which was already included in the WIPO system.  Within WTO, its provisions
have supranational effect, which means that, by signing and ratifying the agreement,
a Member State permits WTO and other members to control its compliance with the TRIPs
Agreement and permits the Dispute Settlement Body to impose sanctions in cases of
non-compliance.
Hoekman and Kostecki (2001,  p. 274) characterized the TRIPs Agreement as
“unique in the WTO context”, because “it imposes obligations upon Governments to adopt
a set of substantive rules in an area that traditionally has been regarded to be in the purview
of domestic regulation”.  Maskus (2000,  p. 2) came to a similar conclusion about the
significance of the TRIPs Agreement:  “It is the first multilateral trade accord that aims at
achieving partial harmonization in an extensive area of business regulation”.  As regards its
general implications, both texts share the view that the TRIPs Agreement forms the
“vanguard of efforts” (Maskus, 2000, p. 2) to include more regulatory policies in the WTO
context, establishing more “‘behind the border’ regulatory regimes” (Hoekman and
Kostecki, 2001,  p. 274).  Other agreements of the Uruguay round besides the TRIPs
Agreement also contain some provisions with a direct impact on parts of national
regulations, most prominently the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the
Agreement on Trade-related Investment Measures (TRIMs Agreement), as Holmes (2004)
elaborated.
The nature or major characteristic and the impact of the agreement can therefore
be summarized as “harmonization of national intellectual property regulation”, because the
TRIPs Agreement (and similar parts of the TRIMs Agreement and GATS) implicitly
considers harmonization as a norm for the WTO agenda.  In effect, national intellectual
property systems had to be adapted to the specific provisions.  Correspondingly, the use of
bilateral pressure and FTAs is a part of the international IPRs regime, whereas
industrialized countries use their economic and political power (and bargaining power) to
shape the system of norms and rules according to their domestic demand (figure 2).
12 This would be the case for the rule on special and differential treatment, which allowed protectionism
depending on the country’s status as an LDC (Krasner, 1983, p. 4).Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
64
General judgements on this development within the WTO framework are mixed.
For example, Guy de Jonquières (1998, cited in Holmes, 2004, p. 2) of the Financial Times
argues:  “As liberalization extends deeper into countries’ domestic economies, the opening
of markets increasingly requires global disciplines on national regulatory policies”.  The
economist Rodrik (1999, p. 148) draws a different conclusion and criticizes specifically the
TRIPs and TRIMs agreements as “cases of ‘forced’ harmonization”, because they
unnecessarily constrain policy choices in participating countries.  While Rodrik (1999, 
pp. 147-148) generally embraces better regulatory standards serving transparency, in his
view both agreements fail to present a solution for developing countries, which would
either improve economic performance or exhibit democratic legitimacy by avoiding
discrimination of social groups.
As for the case of bilateral pressure by industrializing countries, Rodrik’s
argument is strengthened, because the respective FTAs evidently represent specific interests
in IPR enforcement rather than good solutions for the trade partners.  The United States,
most prominently among other industrialized countries, uses FTAs as another channel of
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influence to expand national intellectual property regulation of trading partners beyond the
provisions of the TRIPs Agreement.  The World Bank (2005, p. 1) reports that the United
States trade diplomacy has undergone a “considerable shift” by introducing intellectual
property provisions as a “central element” into regional and bilateral FTAs.  Besides the
general trend towards bilateral and regional FTAs, the strategy is to enforce and even
extend  tête-à-tête what had been achieved in WTO since 1995.  As in the GATT
negotiations, the demand for stronger intellectual property protection and enforcement is
combined with incentives of preferential access to an attractive trade partner.
In the United States, the domestically perceived decline of competitiveness has led
to aggressive ways to secure the technological margin in the global economy.  The objective
is to achieve protection that “[…] reflects a standard of protection similar to that found in
the United States law”. (USTR, 2002, cited in World Bank, 2005, p. 1) Signatories of such
new FTAs have been Australia, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Singapore and
Viet Nam, among others (with different provisions on intellectual property protection),
using the quid pro quo approach of trade agreements for their own advantage.  The World
Bank (2005,  pp. 2-3) identifies some common elements in the provisions of respective
FTAs, which, for instance, affect exemptions of patent protection,13 constrain compulsory
licensing of pharmaceutical patents, or special protection for pharmaceutical test data.  All
three reflect the existing but declining comparative advantage of the United States
pharmaceutical and medicine industry (Maskus, 2000, p. 78).
Both the TRIPs Agreement on a global level and FTAs in specific countries
achieved harmonization.  Intellectual property systems in developing countries have
undergone considerable changes since 1995.  Primo Braga (1996, p. 356) points out that
a look at some basic intellectual property law provisions shows that the “agreement will
require significant reforms in… legal regimes” concerning the protection in certain sectors
as well as protection periods (figure 3).
The respective institutional capacity for the implementation of the TRIPs
Agreement has always been a concern.  It is argued that judicial systems are already
overstretched (Primo Braga, 1996, p. 358).  Numbers estimated by the World Bank and
UNCTAD show that setup costs can reach millions of dollars, and annual costs such as in
Bangladesh can exceed $1 million each year (World Bank, 1999; UNCTAD, 1996, cited in
ICTSD and UNCTAD 2003, p. 50).  However, a look at what Holmes (2004, p. 27) calls
“wiggle room” emphasizes the options that States have for implementation.  For instance,
the breadth of a patent can be defined according to its own requirements, and approval for
patents from other countries can be denied if they are perceived as invalid (Holmes, 2004, 
p. 27).  Furthermore, strategic choices for national intellectual property systems are left, as
regards FTA negotiations, with industrialized countries as well as for further patent
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harmonization in relation to the Patent Cooperation Treaty of WIPO14 or the draft
substantive patent law treaty.  Nonetheless, the process of further, voluntary patent
harmonization has gained momentum, especially in the last few years, as the patent
statistics of WIPO show:  from 40,000 applications in 1995 to more than 120,000 in 2004
(2005, p. 3).
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
From a developing country’s perspective, implementation of the TRIPs Agreement
has imposed costs on a large scale, but not just in terms of its immediate implementation
and enforcement capacities.  The agreement also adjusts continuous transfer payments
directly and indirectly in terms of license fees and prohibiting imitation for industrial
development and for producing cheap consumer goods.  However, the impact of the TRIPs
Agreement goes further, as globalization generally constrains domestic policy choices for
economic policy, the TRIPs Agreement defines the scope and types of IPRs and dictates the
Figure 3.  Patent protection, 1994
Source: Recreated according to Carlos A. Primo Braga (1996).  “Trade-related intellectual property issues:
the Uruguay round agreement and its economic implications”, in Will Martin and L. Winters, eds., The Uruguay
Round and the Developing Countries (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press), p. 357.
14 The treaty lowers considerably the transaction costs for patent protection in different regulatory environments,
because the treaty facilitates protection in multiple member countries with one application (Primo Braga,
1996, p. 360; Maskus, 2000, p. 67).Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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rules for enforcement and administration in national intellectual property systems.  In 2005,
major changes in intellectual property systems in developing countries were mostly
finished, but the question whether or not the enforcement can be managed is left open.
Analysis of the preconditions and the characteristics of the international
intellectual property regime (consisting of the TRIPs Agreement in the WTO framework
and its parallel unilateral and bilateral attempts by industrialized countries) elaborates how
and why this unprecedented harmonization effort by the industrialized countries was made
feasible.  Discussion of the economic rationale and the political economy of intellectual
property protection made clear that industrialized countries faced a dilemma, as intellectual
property regulation coverage was traditionally within national borders but the innovating
industries increasingly exported and invested abroad.  Owing to the weaknesses of the
WIPO system, GATT/WTO offered the best institutional environment for cross-border
enforcement of IPRs.  The quid pro quo character of trade negotiations along with the
mixed positions led to a decline in resistance against such a far-reaching agreement among
the developing countries.
On the other hand, the WTO framework has been moved towards European
Union-style “deep integration” through the adjustment of national regulations to common
standards, most importantly with the TRIPs Agreement (see Holmes, 2004,  pp.  6-7).
Industrialized countries still seek to push the achieved harmonization beyond the provisions
of the TRIPs Agreement in order to protect their domestic intellectual property-related
interests.  Overall, through the TRIPs Agreement and secondary attempts, industrialized
countries were able to “transnationalize” their concept of intellectual property protection
and their high standards of protection according to their state of industrial development
rather than that of developing countries.
The emergence of the international intellectual property regime also comprises
implications for policymakers in developing countries that go beyond the commitment to
implement an international agreement.  It means that TNCs, the main actors in the global
production network and innovators in the knowledge-based economy, generally prefer
higher standards of intellectual property protection with regard to the relocation of
intellectual property-sensitive and technology-intensive parts of production.  For that
reason, ever-growing investments in R and D and shorter product cycles for staying on the
competitive edge have increased the willingness of TNCs to reap the rewards for
technological advance.  The internationalization of R and D shows that TNCs are
increasingly willing to relocate intellectual property-sensitive and vital parts of production
to developing countries.  The TRIPs Agreement might have paved the way by ensuring
respective protection standards; however, a comprehensive strategy for economic
development that integrates intellectual property regulation in a package of policies,
including education and general technology policies as well as proactive policies towards
FDI and trade, remains essential.Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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Structurally, developing countries played a passive role in both economic
integration, driven mainly by TNCs of industrialized countries, and the parallel political
integration in the context of GATT/WTO.  Nevertheless, as the trend of internationalization
of R and D illustrates, today’s global production networks offer an opportunity to benefit
from continuous production fragmentation as well as to participate even in the “production
of knowledge” in order to climb the technology ladder.  Furthermore, so-called wiggle room
is still left in the provisions of the TRIPs Agreement in order to adjust the national
intellectual property system to the individual situation, and States may choose whether to
finalize and ratify preferential trading arrangements which contain WTO plus intellectual
property provisions.Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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griculture is the economic activity that still provides a livelihood for the
majority of people, especially the poor.  Every effort thus needs to be
made towards making this sector more productive and able to sustain a better quality
of life for those who remain dependent on agriculture as a livelihood while also
indirectly contributing to improved welfare among the remainder of the population.
This understanding has not always been the driving force behind policymaking.  It
took the Uruguay Round to start mainstreaming agricultural trade into the multilateral
trading system under the World Trade Organization in 1995.  Although a latecomer,
agriculture is now at centre stage of the Doha Development Agenda negotiations and,
in the view of many, is holding the Doha Round captive as it prevents agreements in
other areas of negotiations until members concur on agricultural trade liberalization.
Meanwhile, despite Uruguay round liberalization, agriculture remains the most
distorted sector due to the heavy use of trade barriers and support policies (for both
domestic production and exports).  Most nations still seek “windows of exception” for
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their agricultural sector, be it for the use of trade barriers or support policies.  Since all
such instruments distort the relative prices of agricultural products vis-à-vis other
products, they affect every country’s overall economy and its sectors differently,
depending on production and consumption patterns.  However, multilateral
negotiations so far have focused considerably more on one distorting instrument,
export subsidies, thus resulting in much less progress in freeing trade in agriculture
and removing other support for domestic agricultural production.  This paper argues
that this focus might have been misdirected, given the available evidence of sources of
welfare effects in agricultural trade liberalization efforts.  It is time to start closing
windows of exception for some and start opening windows of opportunity for all.
Irrespective of how (and when) the Doha Round will close, other important
aspects of trade liberalization in agriculture are explored in this paper.  One aspect is
a process of increased reliance on less transparent instruments of protection.  It
appears that trade in agriculture follows the same trade path as that followed with
industrial goods during the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) era; with
a reduction in import tariffs and quotas, there was a clear increase in the use of
non-tariff and non-border barriers (such as quality standards, safety standards and
rules of origin).  This paper comments on some instruments that have the potential to
be used for non-tariff protection, i.e., geographical indications and food safety
standards.  While these have already been used extensively by some trading nations,
many others (particularly developing countries) have failed to see how they could
significantly contribute to development.  This, however, does not in general apply to
the use of food and agricultural product safety standards.  It is true that these can be
used as (effective) trade barriers.  However, with some proactive strategic thinking,
these standards could be transformed into incentives for economy-wide positive
changes in the production of food.  Coupled with the adaptation of modernized
regulatory systems, this would become a driver of increase competitiveness in both
domestic and export markets.
Another aspect of agricultural trade liberalization is preferential liberalization
through bilateral or regional trade agreements.  The Asian and Pacific region is
a fertile breeding ground for new agreements of this type, with almost 100 of them
now in force or being negotiated that include at least one member of ESCAP.  ESCAP
has developed a database for tracking and (ultimately) assessing the performance of
these preferential trade agreements.  It can be used in gaining a better understanding
of the treatment of any particular sector, including agriculture, in the preferential
agreements as well as the contribution of the design of such agreements to their
performance.  The database is also considered helpful to policymakers in their
management of multilateral, preferential and autonomous liberalization.
(continued from page 71)Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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1. INTRODUCTION1
Agriculture is the economic activity that still provides a livelihood for the majority
of people, especially the poor.  Every effort thus needs to be made towards making this
sector more productive and able to sustain a better quality of life for the people working in
it as well as indirectly contributing to improved welfare among the remainder of the
population.  This understanding has not always been accepted.  During a major part of the
twentieth century, in many developing countries, it was strongly held that agriculture and
modern development were mutually exclusive and policy attention was given to
industrialization.  This extended to a diminishing contribution of trade in agricultural
products to development; therefore, developing countries did not demand that agricultural
products be included in the multilateral trading system during the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) era.
At the same time, in many developed countries, the agricultural sector was already
the smallest in terms of GDP and employment generation.  In most European countries,
what was left of the agricultural sector was in need of special attention by protectionist
trade policies and domestic support.  Starting with the political reasons for reconstructing
long-term peace in Europe after the Second World War, “meddling” in agricultural
production and trade continued for such reasons, as providing food security, protecting the
farming community from natural and man-made shocks, preserving “rural life”, protecting
the environment, or simply owing to the pressure of strong farmers’ lobbies.  Ultimately,
agriculture became the most distorted sector, hurting the poor who depend on agricultural
production, mostly in developing countries.
After the Uruguay Round, agriculture made a comeback in development strategies.
It was “mainstreamed” into the multilateral trading system under the World Trade
Organization (WTO) through implementation of the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) of the
Uruguay Round for developed country members by the year 2000, and for developing
members by 2005.  AoA required members to translate all existing border measures
other than customary customs duties (annex 5, paragraph 6) on agricultural products into
so-called equivalent tariffs (a process known as “tariffication”).  The idea behind this was to
introduce the same measurement standard for the level of protection that prevailed in
agricultural trade, this standard being an equivalent tariff.  By binding the equivalent tariffs,
benchmarks were introduced against which all members would have been assessed and, in
relation to which, further liberalization following a predetermined timetable would have
been undertaken.
1 “Issues of Interest in WTO for Countries with Economies in Transition:  Doha Development Agenda” was
recently published in this Review (vol. 1, No. 2, November 2005).  It covers extensively issues of agricultural
trade negotiations under the Doha Development Agenda, particularly those relevant to ESCAP members and
associate members.  The present paper makes use of that text but does not repeat its content unless doing so
cannot be avoided.Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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In the implementation of this agreement, members managed to bind their tariffs at
very high levels, known as “dirty tariffication”, making further liberalization efforts more
difficult, as seen so far during the current round of negotiations (see table 1).  To achieve
any actual liberalization, cuts in bound rates must be deep; in fact, they must be much
deeper than most members are ready to accept.
Table 1.  Comparison of bound and applied tariffs: import-weighted average




Developed 27 22 14
Developing 48 27 21
Least developed 78 14 13
World 37 24 17
Source: Jean, S., D. Laborde and W. Martin, 2006. “Consequences of alternative formulas for agricultural
tariff cuts”, in K. Anderson and W. Martin, eds., Agricultural Trade Reform and the Doha Development Round
(Hampshire, United Kingdom, Palgrave Macmillan).
Note: Figures for regions are computed as import-weighted averages across countries.
Despite the obvious distortions caused by interventionist policies in the
agricultural sector, Governments still maintain that the agricultural sector requires and
deserves “windows of exception” when it comes to streamlining measures that distort
agricultural trade.2 In many instances, Governments have not been willing to separate
objectives that belong to domestic policies3 from those that are under the auspices of trade
policy.  Corden (1974) showed a long time ago that using trade policy for non-trade
objectives is far more costly and less effective than using policies which can target chosen
objectives directly (the so-called “specificity rule”).  The Governments of both developing
and developed countries appear to have no problems with the obvious inefficiency in using
social resources when attempting to solve environmental, employment or other non-trade
problems by relying only or mostly on trade policies.
Among the instruments of trade policies, Governments use mostly tariffs
(in particular, per unit or specific tariffs), quantitative border barriers and export subsidies.
2 The phrase is taken from a statement of the former Commerce Minister of the Government of India, Mr. Arun
Jaitley, quoted in Deardorff and Stern (2004), p. 11, “We do not wish to stall the negotiations on agriculture,
but we hope adequate windows of exception for economies like India that are highly dependent on agriculture,
are created”.
3 For example, food security, a safety net for the poor, addressing the risks and returns in farming faced by small
and marginal farmers, or rural development.  See also Srinivasan (2003).Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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Additionally there are measures of domestic support (linked to production) that can be used
in combination with other non-trade policies in creating shelter for the domestic economy
or more often only selected parts of it.  Most recent quantitative analyses show that, out of
the measures that Governments have been using to intervene in agricultural sectors, market
access measures (i.e., tariffs) have had the strongest impact, while domestic support and
export subsidies were associated with less distortion (Hertel and Keeney, 2006).
The effects of protection are well known from theory as well as the experience of
the many countries practising it:  raised domestic prices of agricultural products,
particularly food; depressed world prices of agricultural products; distorted signals for
resource allocation and entrenchments of resources in inefficient uses, making it difficult
for Governments to eliminate protection.  Without the removal or significant weakening of
this protection, trade cannot make production more efficient and competitive nor can it
attract trade-creating and welfare-increasing investment.  Without these actions, it is close
to impossible to increase prosperity over the long term.
This paper looks at several selected issues related to agricultural trade
liberalization.  At the outset, the achievements resulting from the Sixth Ministerial
Conference of WTO, held in Hong Kong, China, from 13 to 18 December 2005, in relation
to the agricultural negotiations, are highlighted.  This section then discusses the fallacies
and misdirected priorities of the Doha Development Agenda, which arguably have focused
only on some of the (needed) disciplines in agricultural trade.  It also looks at the role of
building coalitions in bringing the negotiations to a successful closure.  Section 3 leaves the
area of negotiations to explore how traditional “hard” protectionist measures in agricultural
trade (e.g., quotas, tariffs, explicit subsidies) are being replaced by “soft” measures that,
nevertheless, contain very sharp teeth for occasions when tougher action is desired.  In the
fourth section, the preferential trade liberalization in agriculture from the perspective of the
Asian and Pacific region is reviewed and the work of ESCAP on the database for
preferential trade agreements is described.  The final section of the paper offers some
concluding thoughts.
2. CURRENT STATE OF PLAY
Long before the unplanned loud and colourful start to the previously mentioned
Sixth WTO Ministerial Conference, it was clear that yet again agricultural trade
negotiations were proving very unpalatable to the taste of many stakeholders.  Agriculture
indeed turned into such a tension-generating agenda item that some senior trade negotiators
were heard saying that agriculture should have never have been placed under the
GATT/WTO “coverage”.  In their view, not only has agriculture itself proven difficult to
liberalize in trade and to liberate from non-economic objectives, it has paved the way for
other negotiating areas to enter into the multilateral system that are similarly hard to mold
into the consensus-based decision-making of that system.  Nonetheless, agriculture wasAsia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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given the central role in the Sixth Ministerial Conference when many members confirmed
that they would consider it a “make-or-break” issue.  In the end, as discussed in ESCAP
(2006), it was not agriculture that kept the agenda of the Ministerial Conference and the
Doha Development Agenda on the rails; it was, in fact, the collective understanding that
derailing the round would probably be too costly for any country individually and for the
global economy as a whole.
(a) The Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong, China – “Kicking the can
down the road”4
As expected, the Sixth Ministerial Conference did not result in any surprises.  With
respect to agriculture, progress was made in all three pillars:  market access, domestic
support and export competition.  New elements in the Declaration of that Conference
included the following:
O Market access – the formalization of a “working hypothesis” on structuring
tariffs for reductions within four tiers, with steeper cuts on higher tariffs but
no further details on the formula.  The key principles for constructing the
formula should be:  (i) a single approach (excluding only least-developed
countries); (ii) reductions in bound rates; (iii) “operationally effective”
special treatment for developing countries; and (iv) allowing all countries
flexibility in protecting “sensitive products”;
O Domestic support – confirmation of the “working hypothesis” that the
aggregate measure of support would be classified into three bands.  The
European Union will occupy the top band facing the highest linear tariff cuts,
the United States of America and Japan will be placed in the middle band and
the remaining members listed in the bottom band.  The text also specifies that
overall cuts in trade-distorting domestic support must be at least equal to or
greater than the sum of the reductions in the amber box, blue box and de
minimis (exempted) support;5
O Export competition – the Ministerial Declaration, adopted on 18 December
2005, announced parallel elimination of all forms of export subsidies and
disciplines for all export measures with equivalent effect by the end of 2013
together with progressive phasing-out such that a substantial part would be
realized by the end of the first half of the implementation period.  This means
that 2013 will mark the end of agricultural export subsidies, export credits,
4 The phrase “kicking the can down the road” is borrowed from Heydon (2006, p. 5), who attributes it to
a United States senator.  Emphasis has been added by the author.
5 This should act as a deterrent to simple reclassification of subsidies from one box to another in order to escape
meeting commitments.Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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export credit guarantees or insurance programmes, activities of State-trading
enterprises that are deemed subsidized and food aid that does not conform to
various disciplines.  It also refers to an end to all export subsidies for cotton
by developed countries in 2006.6
It is also important to note that paragraph 24 of the Ministerial Declaration links
market access ambitions in agricultural and non-agricultural market access.
(b) Coalitions – who is kicking harder and in which direction?
To decipher what is going on in or with agricultural negotiations, it is highly
relevant to be aware of the major players and groupings actively cooperating in the
negotiations.  The Asian and Pacific region is not represented by a single group or coalition
speaking with one voice in WTO on agricultural trade issues.  The region includes least
developed countries (LDCs), small and vulnerable economies, developing countries that are
net food importers and net food exporters, and developed economies.  These countries
opted to form alliances in the Cairns Group, Group of Twenty, Group of Ten, Group of
Thirty-three, Group of One Hundred and Ten,7 and African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP)
countries, and small and vulnerable economies (SVEs).  The only group that has not
recruited any members from the ESCAP region is the Tropical Product Group (figure 1).
Several countries (Australia, Japan, Kyrgyzstan, Maldives and New Zealand) belong only to
one group (Cairns, G-10, and SVEs).  Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand are the most
active, with alliances in three groups:  Cairns, G-33 and G-20.  The global South-South
divide is quite noticeable, with the Cairns Group, representing the interests of net food
exporters (including Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand from developing
countries, and Australia and New Zealand from the developed countries) being at one end
of the spectrum in terms of negotiating positions and the net food-importing countries,
which seem not to be formally linked to any groupings, at the other end.
To compensate for these wedge-inserting groups, there are ad hoc alliances called
consensus builders.  In agricultural negotiations in this trade round, these alliances were
noticeable when the European Union and the United States first came up with a joint
proposal in 2003, and again when the Five Interested Parties, that is, the United States, the
European Union, India, Brazil and Australia, formulated the 2004 July Framework.  The
so-called New Quad that emerged at the Ministerial Conference, comprising the European
6 The Declaration also calls for faster and deeper reductions in trade-distorting domestic subsidies for cotton
than those that will be achieved through general schedules for domestic support to farming.
7 The G 110 is associated with a meeting of G 20, G 33 and G 90 (64 of which are WTO members) at the Sixth
Ministerial Conference.  There is another group indirectly linked to agricultural liberalization, even though not
involved in the AoA negotiations.  It is related to negotiations on geographical indications (GIs) within the
Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights and they are known as “Friends of GIs”.  Members
from the ESCAP region are India, Thailand and Turkey.Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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Union, the United States, India and Brazil, is still the strongest force keeping this part of the
negotiations rolling.
The question is whether developing countries of the Asian and Pacific region,
including India and China, could or should make more of an impact by trying to form
a regional alliance.  With the region being so diverse, it is difficult to see what would be the
unifying common interest for such a coalition.  Net exporters (Cairns Group) stand to
benefit from liberalization.  Their interests cannot be supported by net food importers and
other countries with problems related to accessing world markets, at least as long as there is
no instrument of redistribution of gains from trade.  The need to introduce a comprehensive
and operational compensation package for trade reform (or trade adjustment package) may
be one area of possible common interest.  While the Uruguay round included a decision to
provide financial and other assistance to LDCs and net food-importing (developing)
countries, the decision was never implemented.  With some countries already having some
experience in designing a compensatory package for trade adjustment, notably for loss of
tariff revenue at the preferential trade liberalization level within the South Asian
Association for Regional Cooperation, it is plausible for this initiative to be taken up by
Figure 1.  Coalitions on agricultural trade negotiationsAsia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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other developing countries in Asia and the Pacific.  It could provide a unifying force for
furthering regional cooperation/integration and could perhaps be extended to multilateral
negotiations (see Dhar, 2005).  It does not have to be limited to agricultural trade, but can
be cross-cutting through the Doha Development Agenda.8
(c) Is the can being kicked off the road?
The most noticeable development in the area of agricultural negotiations in the
aftermath of the Ministerial Conference was the issuance of a “list of questions” by
Mr. Crawford Falconer, Chairman of the WTO Committee on Agriculture.  In sending the
list to the members’ delegations, he wanted to “underline …that we have a huge amount of
work to do” (WTO, 2006).  This could not be closer to the truth.
Delegations are faced with the extremely difficult task of agreeing on, for
example, relevant liberalization thresholds for developed and developing members, the
treatment of sensitive products, special products for developing countries, the special
safeguard mechanism, disciplines for “food for aid” as well as export subsidies, export
credit, State trading enterprises and some additional details on cotton.  For some of these
there is no precedent or experience based on previous WTO-enforced disciplines (e.g.,
subsidy elements of export credits and guarantees or financing for food aid).  Without
a doubt, it will be close to a miracle if results can be delivered on agriculture and, in turn,
almost certainly on other items of the Doha Development Agenda, with non-agricultural
market access, services, trade facilitation and development aspects of all of these areas
being the most important.  What would facilitate this outcome? As decision-making in
WTO is based on consensus, it is of the utmost importance that all involved understand all
the concerns.  It is also essential that free riding is either eliminated or minimized so that all
members take an active role in closing the deal.  After all, everyone will be involved in
sharing the costs and benefits of the agreed liberalization, even if some will gain a bigger
share than others.
8 Although not from the Asian and Pacific region, another good example of possible coalition-building is the
“Uruguay round ceiling tariff issue” request by a small group of developing countries led by Kenya.  On the
other hand, there are also strong separatist forces most strongly linked to a debate on the erosion of
preferences.  However, erosion is not stopable if there is trust in the multilateral trading system, as any
progress on the most-favoured-nation front will automatically have implications for other preferences.  In the
long term, developing countries are better off with a free(er) multilateral regime than with maintaining high
non-reciprocal preferences, as the usefulness of the latter for development could be questioned.Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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3. FALLACIES AND PRIORITIES9
Unfortunately, a clear understanding of all the concerns cannot always be
achieved.  An increasing number of stakeholders involved in the preparation of negotiations
and the process of negotiations is adhering to the principles of inclusiveness and
transparency.  However, this does not necessarily or automatically produce the same
understanding of the problems among all the interested parties.  In what follows, we briefly
discuss how the lack or misinterpretation of information could lead to the negotiations
becoming stalled.
Preparations for the Ministerial Conference were accompanied by a stream of
academic and other publications containing, inter alia, quantitative estimations of the
impacts that various Doha Development Agenda scenarios would have had in terms of
welfare in individual countries or groups of countries.  While this was well intended, it
could backfire as it did just at the time of Sixth Ministerial Conference, with the estimates
of the overall monetary gains from the Doha Development Agenda.  This paper provides
a brief tour d’horizon of the issues associated with the quantitative studies currently
available.10 Basically, there are two problems with quantitative analysis of (multilateral)
trade liberalization.  The first is related to models that most empiricists use and the fact that
numerical findings obtained by these models are often knowingly or unintentionally
misinterpreted and misused.  The second problem occurs due to less-than-acceptable data
quality and reliability as well as from data and other quantitative information (including
results of quantitative analyses) being wrongly interpreted and used.  Let us discuss, albeit
in simplistic terms, each of these in turn.
(a)  Models for quantitative analysis – making a choice
As discussed in Piermartini and Teh (2005), while quantification of the effects of
economic policies has become an ordinary approach in economic analysis due to advances
in theory and computational and data-processing capacities, the variability of models used
to capture the impacts of policies has remained somewhat narrow.  Most commonly used
quantitative analytical techniques in the area of trade are computable general equilibrium
(CGE) and gravity models.  CGE models are economists’ laboratories in which they can run
computer-based simulations of “real economy” replicas.  In the area of trade, these models
are used mostly to estimate the effects of changes in different policies (such as trade
liberalization) throughout an economy.  This “general equilibrium” nature of CGE models
is most valuable because it reflects the interdependency of economic variables.
Policymakers can verify from the model of what they know by intuition or from experience,
9 Inspiration for this subsection title comes from Rae and Shakur (2005).
10 Readers who prefer a more technical approach to this problem are referred to Hertel and Keeney (2006) or
Keeney and Hertel (2005).Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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that is, they cannot give more to one group if they do not take away from another group,
ceteris paribus.  It is this feature of the model that makes it instructional and helpful when
choosing from different policy options.
However, as is the case with all economic models, CGE models are based on sets
of restrictive assumptions that make them “easy to use” but also less like the “real thing”,
i.e., a living complex economy.  Because of high degrees of aggregation in most of these
models, it is quite possible that many important underlying links remain hidden.  The other
complexities related to the specifications of models, data availability and reliability, lack of
attention given to alternative assumptions as well as a host of other issues is such that these
models should be labelled “use with utmost care”.  Anything less would be irresponsible.
At best, the numerical results obtained when using CGE models can be used as reference
points for the order of magnitude of potential effects if the world does not change
significantly in the period of analysis.  Most modellers and economic analysts are well
aware of these caveats and use them with care and responsibility.  On the other hand, others
(e.g., policymakers, civil society, bureaucrats and parliamentarians) who obtain these results
may not be aware of the “use with utmost care” label.  Too often, the results of CGE
analysis are misinterpreted and they could be intentionally used to misrepresent the
outcome of a policy change that is analysed.
The gravity model has become a very fashionable tool for quantitative analysis in
the field of trade.  While the model has been around for several decades, it is the surge in
preferential trade agreements that has really boosted its use.  The model is used to measure
and explain the effects on trade flows of a policy that has already taken effect, and not for
questions related to the implementation of new policies (such as changes in tariff structure).
However, the results can still be used as inputs in future policymaking as “past policy
impacts may serve to understand the implications of a change in future policy” (Piermartini
and Teh, 2005).  In other words, as laymen would say, one should learn from somebody
else’s mistakes.  A particular problem with such models is that so far in explaining trade
between two countries (even WTO members) there is no variable to reflect their
commitments in multilateral liberalization.  A more basic problem comes from using
unweighted distance as a proxy for trade costs (and/or transport costs).  However, it should
be obvious that the cost of cargo being transported a certain distance across the European
continent between, for example, Zagreb in Croatia and Luxemburg will be very different
from that for the same type of cargo being transported the same distance across the African
continent between, for example, Yaoundé in Cameroon and Bangui in Central African
Republic.
This and other more specific problems aside, it is still unlikely that numbers
obtained by either type of models will be replicated in the real world.  According to DeRosa
and Gilbert (2005), the CGE models used to predict Uruguay round gains proved to have
underpredicted gains.  In contrast, gravity models tend to overestimate gains, particularlyAsia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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those of some preferential trade agreements.  The bottom line is that better models and
better data are needed.  In the meantime, as is often the case in economic policy, a rule of
thumb should be applied.  When it comes to trade liberalization, there is no doubt that the
thumb (even if the hand is invisible!) points towards more liberal trade for all.
(b) Data
Another problem with using quantitative analysis is the availability of data in
a multilateral context.  Many countries do not have complete or reliable data series.  In
addition, in some cases, data are misinterpreted and misused even if they are not used as
inputs in further quantitative analysis.  For example, Panagariya (2005) and Anderson and
others (2005) commented on misinterpreting Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) measures of producer-support estimates as “export subsidies”.  Such
misrepresentation of results leads to the creation of fallacies and, from there, to the choice
of the wrong priorities for negotiating agenda.  An example is that the focus given by using
wrong estimates for subsidies drove many WTO members into prioritizing negotiations in
the area of agricultural export subsidies.  However, empirical findings on the contribution to
economic welfare of agricultural trade liberalization are converging towards a conclusion
that, at the global level, the removal of export subsidies gives the smallest share of increases
in welfare (around 2 per cent).  Furthermore, removal of export subsidies has a negative
impact on non-OECD countries that is compensated for by the positive impact of improving
import access.  The removal of domestic support measures, according to these findings, is
more than twice as good as the elimination of export subsidies (5 per cent of the total
increase in welfare).  The removal of barriers to market access is what drives the increase in
welfare, with the contribution being 93 per cent.11
Given the fragility of quantitative assessments in the field of trade, it is extremely
important that findings are interpreted correctly and used in the proper context.  If this is not
practised by all, it is easy to hijack some of the results for the interest of specific groups.
Identification of the right source of positive change in welfare is crucial to the identification
of viable negotiating positions for particular groups.12
11 According to Will Martin, market access barriers are the key in agricultural trade liberalization as “deep
reductions in agricultural tariffs would deliver twelve times the gains that would be achieved by abolishing
export subsidies and trade-distorting domestic support to agriculture.” See <http://web.worldbank.org/
WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:20716308~menuPK:51062077~pagePK:34370~
piPK:34424~theSitePK:4607,00.html>.
12 The largest culprit in the area of using agricultural export subsidies has been the European Union.  In the Doha
Development Agenda, the European Union agreed to eliminate the use of this instrument and even accepted
the date (2013) by which to do so.  It appears that the European Union had been reducing these subsidies since
2000 and that it would have continued doing so unilaterally.  As Hoekman and Messerlin (2006, p. 197) state:
“…the European Union may be selling rapidly depreciating ‘assets’.”Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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4. SIDE EFFECTS OF THE WTO NEGOTIATIONS:  FUZZIER
PROTECTION
Sequential rounds of multilateral trade liberalization have been followed by the
emergence of new border and non-border barriers in an effort by Governments to replace
lost protection due to the reduction and elimination of tariffs and quotas.  These new
barriers appear to be less transparent13 than traditional hard border barriers, i.e., tariffs and
quantitative restrictions.  Most such barriers are hidden as customs procedures and
administrative practices, special charges and taxes, restrictive practices and technical
barriers to trade.  In agricultural trade, technical barriers to trade are becoming increasingly
prevalent.  Stringent policy measures through sanitary regulations and quality standards,
safety and industrial standards have become the norm rather than the exception.  In the
context of non-reciprocal or reciprocal preferential trade, rules of origin can also easily be
used to obscure protectionist practices by the importing country.
In view of the evident ease with which “bird flu” as well as similar potentially
very serious human illnesses can spread, no one would argue in favour of a total ban on
sanitary and other related measures, which are meant to protect public health.  What is
arguable, however, is the stringency of the measures.  If the social marginal benefit to
public health from an additional measure (or the toughening of an existing one) is not
greater than the social marginal cost resulting from such a measure through the reduction of
competition and efficiency, then the change is not justified.  It does not mean that it will not
be adopted, but at least the public deserves to know the cost of such a change.
This paper, being a brief overview of several issues, cannot go into a comprehensive
analysis of the various soft barriers.  However, two areas are worth further comment.  One
is related to geographical indications, and the other to food safety requirements.
(a)  Geographical indications
Geographical indications, or “GIs” as they are often referred to, “identify a good
as originating in the territory of a Member, or a region or locality in that territory, where
a given quality, reputation or other characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to its
geographical origin” (Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs),
article 22.1).  These mainly comprise place names used to identify products that originate
from those places and which have these characteristics (e.g., “Champagne”, “Madeira” and
“Basmati”).  Two articles in the TRIPs Agreement define protection in relation to
geographical indications.  Article 22 covers all products by defining a standard level of
protection.  This standard requires that geographical indications must be protected for the
13 They also appear harder to manage in the multilateral negotiating forum as many instruments tend to be
labelled as “domestic regulation”.Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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benefit of the public, as well as to ensure fair competition.  Article 23 provides a higher or
enhanced level of protection for geographical indications for wines and spirits.  Exceptions
contained in article 24 allow for no or limited protection in cases where a name has become
the common (“generic”) term (e.g., “cheddar”) and when a term has already been registered
as a trademark.  The Doha Development Agenda focused on two additional issues of
a higher level of protection:  the creation of a multilateral register for wines and spirits and
the extension of the higher level of protection beyond wines and spirits.
WTO members differ with respect to the ways that they implement and monitor
the geographical indications.  The European Union has the “Register of protected
designations of origin and protected geographical indications”.  In November 2005, the
European Commission added the names of six agricultural products and foodstuffs to the
Register.  These included French, Italian and Spanish products (such as “pâtes d’Alsace” or
“jamón de Trevélez”).  The list contains about 720 product names already protected under
the legislation on the protection of geographical indications and designations of origin and
traditional speciality, which is the third category of rules on agricultural quality products
under name “traditional speciality guaranteed”.  The United States has a less stringent
system known as “certification marks”.
While every country should have an opportunity to secure the best quality of food
and other agricultural items for its society, this should not be done at the expense of other
societies.  Geographical indications have the same effect as escalating tariffs because they
tend to lock in the producers outside the “protected” territory into the lower stages of
production and effectively ban entrance into the processing stage.  In some cases, this could
be justified by the resource endowments and technological capacity of a country; however,
in many cases, this is just another barrier to prevent a lower cost producer from entering the
market with a similar product.14 New proposals to extend geographical indications are still
being debated, with both pro- and anti-camps strongly pushing their points of view.
(b) Food safety standards
There is much evidence that food safety and agricultural health standards are
becoming increasingly challenging for developing country exporters when trying to access
international markets for high-value food products (fruit, vegetables, fish, meat, nuts and
spices).  This is best evidenced through dispute settlement cases in WTO.  Much of the
related literature also confirms that sanitary and phytosanitary standards could be used as
a barrier to trade because of their disguised discriminatory effect and because of the high
14 Perhaps the case of “feta” cheese could be used as an example.  There is also a claim that geographical
indications drive up product (export) values, benefiting producers from price premiums because of the
growing demand for “genuine” products.  However, this increased profit argument does not sit well with the
original argument for introducing geographical indications.Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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cost of compliance.  However, there is also a “silver lining”, as the many developing
countries imposing sanitary and phytosanitary standards on producers and exporters provide
an incentive for economy- and system-wide changes.  These changes include modernization
of production and regulation as well as the adoption of safer and more sustainable
production practices (Jaffe, 2005).
The World Bank (2005) found that the adoption of a strategic approach to food
safety, agricultural health and trade was the best long-term option for developing countries
in meeting the challenges of standards of all types.  It is argued that for countries and
suppliers that are ready to follow this approach, more stringent standards of food safety and
health would represent new opportunities rather than obstacles.  However, producers and
exporters in many developing countries and LDCs find that compliance with these
standards makes it impossible for them to compete in the market they want to access.
Rather than adopting different standards for them, it would be more in line with
a development-oriented round to increase development flows (“aid for trade” included) to
such countries in order to build up their capacities to cope with increasing levels of food
safety standards.
In the above connection, work also needs to be done in the area of standard setting.
So far, developing countries have not contributed substantially to international standard-
setting bodies or other agencies that influence the level and character of standards in terms
of participation or direction.  Here, the focus should not be on readjustment of standards to
a lower or the lowest common denominator.  Rather, it should be on facilitating the use of
practices and procedures that support the adoption of high(er) standards everywhere as long
as an increase in standard level is socially justified.  A related phenomenon emerging in this
area is the increasing role of private standards that are beyond public control yet seem to be
governing international and national trade in food items.  It has been reported that standards
are imposed on producers from developing countries with requirements exceeding
public regulations, especially regarding production processes, certification and traceability
(see, for example, Bureau and others, 2005).  This practice makes the demands of
distributors in developed countries excessively stringent and reduces the cost-effectiveness
of the developing country producers.
5. AGRICULTURE IN REGIONAL PREFERENTIAL TRADE
AGREEMENTS
At a recent World Bank conference, it was claimed that “WTO, particularly for
agricultural liberalization, is more or less the only game in town”.  It has also been claimed
that “very few so-called free trade agreements are really about freeing trade or creating new
trading opportunities” and that they are also very weak in introducing and enforcing
discipline that is the trademark of multilateral liberalization (Lamy, 2006).Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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A cursory glimpse at the map of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) (see figure 2)
shows that this lack of liberalization and discipline dimensions has not prevented
Governments in the region from promoting entry into various types of preferential trade
agreements.  At last count, there were close to 100 preferential trade agreements with at
least one member coming from the membership of ESCAP.  Most of them are shallow
free-trade-area type arrangements, but which venture into non-trade areas of cooperation
and integration.  Many are also still on their way to satisfying WTO compliance
requirements.  While the academic literature has formed views on various important issues
with respect to preferential liberalization, not much progress has been achieved in empirical
testing of PTAs in Asia and the Pacific with regard to these issues.
For example, while the academic literature has a great deal to say on the
advantages of deeper versus shallow integration, too little is understood about this area in
the context of Asian and Pacific PTAs.  There is also insufficient understanding of the
treatment of particular sectors, including agriculture, in these PTAs.  Even less can be said
about the possible long-term contribution of PTA-driven liberalization to freer trade
globally.
To improve understanding of the above issues, the Asia-Pacific Research and
Training Network on Trade (ARTNeT) included a study on regional agricultural trade
liberalization in its 2005 research programme.15 The findings of this project will be
available later in 2006.  However, preliminary results show that, in contrast to WTO
disciplines that embrace these pillars, PTAs as a rule focus on liberalizing only one of them,
i.e., market access.  This is indeed movement in the right direction if we are to rely on
quantitative estimates; it is market access that provides the greatest contribution to increases
in welfare following multilateral liberalization.  Thus far, we have yet to discover PTAs in
the region that deal with the export subsidies and domestic support disciplines in agriculture
as effectively as in multilateral agreements.  Because a large proportion of these agreements
belong to the South-South type, most of them also include significant exclusions in the form
of sensitive products and positive lists.  However, in contrast to proposals for tariff cuts in
the Doha Development Agenda, with preferential trade, market access is freed through cuts
in applied tariff rates, which is also the only sensible direction to take.  As expected, the
agreements do contain safeguards and sanitary and phytosanitary standards, but not beyond
the level of that found in WTO provisions.  Similar to multilateral agreements, PTAs at this
shallow level also do not negotiate on non-tariff measures.
(a) Asia-Pacific preferential trade and investment agreements database16
In addition to being actively engaged in research on trade liberalization, both
multilateral and preferential, of and within national economies, the ESCAP secretariat is
15 More details can be found at <www.artnetontrade.org>.
16 This section is based on Bonapace and Mikic, 2006.Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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Figure 2.  From spaghetti bowl to noodles:  main regional integration arrangements
of ESCAP members and associate members
Source: ESCAP secretariat.
Notes: ANZCERTA – Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement; APEC –
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation; APTA – Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement; ASEAN – Association of South-East
Asian Nations; BIMST-EC – Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation;
CAEU – Central Asian Economic Union; ECOTA – Economic Cooperation Organization Trade Agreement; EEC –
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developing a “one-stop” database that collates descriptive and quantitative information on
more than 80 RTAs/bilateral trade agreements (BTAs) applicable to the region.  The
objective is to provide stakeholders (Governments, researchers, policy analysts and civil
society) with a tool to monitor and analyse developments in preferential trade areas.  The
database is called the Asia-Pacific Preferential Trade and Investment Agreements Database
(APTIAD) and is available at <www.unescap.org/tid/pta%5Fapp/>.  Its current coverage
will be expanded to include trade flows and the development of indicators to assess the
implications of RTAs/BTAs on such flows.
APTIAD has a searchable function that, when fully developed, will contain:
(a) Detailed descriptive and up-to-date information on the provisions of bilateral
and regional agreements;
(b) Statistical data on trade flows, commodity composition and services trade
(where available) by individual agreements;
(c) Selected indicators of performance of individual agreements for pre-defined
periods.
The first phase in developing this database has been completed.17 The current
phase is focusing on the following:
(a) Adding information related to the coverage of each agreement (contingent
protection, standards, services and other areas) by each agreement;
(b) Testing online use of the database;
(c) Developing statistical data sets related to each agreement;
(d) Developing analytical measures and indicators for tracking and assessing
PTA performance in various dimensions, and preparing the results for online
presentation.
Indicators of PTA performance will be useful not only for assessing PTAs already
in force, but also in providing insights into the potential outcomes of proposed agreements.
This information will be used to set out best practices that could be consulted by ESCAP
members when considering the negotiation of a PTA.  Ultimately, the database will provide
the information and analytical basis for work on designing a modal trade agreement for
developing countries, using existing agreements and their performance.  The principles to
be included in such a “blueprint” are:
17 The current version (available on CD and online) encompasses close to 100 agreements.  It covers all the
agreements reported to WTO to date, in which at least one party is in the ESCAP region.  It also includes other
agreements that have not been notified but for which there is official information readily available as well as
those agreements under negotiation for which there has been at least a first formal negotiation round.Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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(a) Compliance with article XXIV of GATT and article C of the General
Agreement on Trade in Services;
(b) Coverage of the so-called WTO+ areas (competition, government
procurement and investment);
(c) The choice of partners with the aim of maximizing own trade creation and
minimizing the trade diversion of others, reluctance to act upon special
interest group pressures and reliance on research and evidence-based
policymaking.
6. CONCLUSIONS
This paper is a tour d’horizon of some of the remaining and emerging issues in
agricultural trade liberalization at all levels and is not intended to be an ambitious effort to
cover any of the mentioned issues in a conclusive and comprehensive way.  For that reason,
any recommendations that could be derived from this paper would lack the unambiguous
support of theory and evidence.  However, it can be said that it is high time for all countries
to move from trade-distorting policies to those that do less harm to the trading system while
more effectively meeting domestic farm policy objectives that include the provision of
security and predictability for farming sectors.
In order to achieve such a policy shift, the creation of less diverse positions in
negotiations from the Asian and Pacific region would be helpful.  Instead of thinking in
terms of “friends of fish”, “friends of GIs” or “very close friends of services”, perhaps
a coalition of “friends of people” should be formed with the interests of the majority being
put first, ahead of those of special interest groups.Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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apid advancements in information and communications technologies (ICT),
 along with reductions in barriers to cross-border trade and factor flows, have
worked in tandem to promote cross-border production sharing.  This slicing of the value
added chain in manufactured goods has been going on for several decades in Asia and
elsewhere.  However, many service activities and processes are also becoming fragmented
from the actual production process and are taking place in different geographical locations,
both within and outside a country.  The phenomenon whereby an entity located in one
country might disperse some of its service activities (or parts thereof) to one or more other
countries has been broadly termed “offshoring” or “outsourcing”.1
There is a small but growing body of analytical work indicating that both
industrial and developing countries stand to reap substantial gains because of global
outsourcing in services.  Specifically, outsourcing ought to lead to efficiency gains for
industrial countries by allowing them the opportunity to specialize in areas of their core
competencies.  It also presents significant benefits for developing countries by opening up
new export, growth and employment opportunities in various tradable service activities.
Nonetheless, there has been widespread negative media coverage in industrial countries
about the offshoring of service sector jobs.  This in turn has given rise to considerable
anxiety among policymakers and the general public that outsourcing could lead to massive
redistribution,  on a net basis, of both blue- and white-collar jobs from industrial to
developing countries.
The Economics of Outsourcing
This policy brief was prepared for the Asia-Pacific Research and Training Network on Trade (ARTNeT)
by Ramkishen Rajan, Associate Professor, School of Public Policy, George Mason University, Arlington,
VA  22201, USA, E-mail:  rrajan1@gmu.edu, and Sadhana Srivastava, Research Scholar, South Asian Studies
Programme,  National University of Singapore.  This and other ARTNeT policy briefs are available at
<www.artnetontrade.org>.
1 The terms offshoring and outsourcing are used interchangeably in this policy brief.  As noted later, this term is
referred to only in the international context, i.e., we focus on cross-border transactions rather than domestic
offshoring.Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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This policy brief offers an initial exploration of the phenomenon of outsourcing,
with particular reference to the Asian and Pacific region.  It has three objectives.  First, it
seeks to bring greater conceptual clarity to the phenomenon of outsourcing, focusing on
definitions and measurement issues, as well as the scope of such activities.  Second, it offers
a broad overview of the economics of outsourcing, assessing its economic implications for
both developed and developing countries.  Third, it considers the role that services trade
liberalization can play in facilitating the process of outsourcing.
Outsourcing of Services:  An Overview
The World Trade Organization (WTO) describes four types of outsourcing using
location and organization control as distinguishing criteria.  With regard to international
trade flows, what is important is not so much organizational control, i.e., intrafirm versus
arms-length, but rather, location of economic activity.  What we are concerned with here is
all forms of international outsourcing as opposed to any type of domestic offshoring.
International outsourcing involving arms-length transactions, with no direct interface
between consumer and producer comes under the rubric of mode 1 services trade.  This
category needs to be distinguished from captive offshoring that involves establishing
a commercial presence by foreign providers in another country, as represented under mode 3
of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).
Offshored service activities have typically been highly commoditizable and
labour-intensive (semi-skilled) in nature.  The most commonly outsourced activities are
ICT-enabled “business processing outsourcing” (BPO) services.  Activities under this
category have included call-centre support and other back-end business process operations
such as data entry and handling, coding, medical and legal transcriptions and testing.
However, outsourcing is also increasingly taking place in higher-end activities or so-called
“knowledge process outsourcing” (KPOs) that include valuation and investment analysis,
market research, consulting, legal and insurance claims processing, software design,
architecture, drafting and filing of patent applications, drug discovery and other types of
research and development (R and D) activities, chip design and embedded systems,
analytics and inventory management.  The KPO business is only at its infancy and is set to
take off in the next few years, just as the BPO business has done in the last few.  According
to one recent estimate, the global KPO market is expected to grow at a cumulative annual
growth rate of 46 per cent, from $1.2 billion in 2003 to $17 billion in 2010.  In contrast, the
low-end BPO market is expected to grow at about half that rate over the same period
(though this would still be a very robust and seemingly sustainable rate of growth)
(Majumdar, 2004).
Measuring the extent of outsourcing activity is an extremely difficult task in view
of the acute lack of comprehensive and internationally harmonized data.  Although data on
computer and information services and other business services reported in the IMF BalanceAsia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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of Payments Statistics Yearbook provides some broad indication of the magnitude of
international cross-border trade in some services, not all such service transactions can
necessarily be characterized as being of the outsourcing variety.
As an indication of the severe measurement difficulties noted above, the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has estimated the
global volume of the offshoring market (excluding domestic outsourcing) in 2003 to have
been anywhere between $10 billion on the low end and $50 billion on the high end (OECD,
2004).  Many of the countries that are witnessing an offshoring wave, namely, India and
China in the Asian and Pacific region, as well as Ireland, Brazil and many smaller Eastern
European countries (such as Estonia and Latvia), have inevitably experienced rapid growth
in exports of business services and computer and information services (Amiti and Wei,
2004).
According to A.T. Kearney’s 2004 index, India ranks as the most attractive service
offshore location; it is expected to capture more than half the global BPO market, with
China and the Russian Federation also among the more attractive destinations (A.T.
Kearney, 2004).  Other attractive destinations include Malaysia, the Philippines and
Singapore.  Interestingly, while the industrial countries, such as Germany, Japan and the
United States, are the top outsourcers in business services, these countries also dominate the
list of top destination countries, with India and China respectively ranking only sixth and
fourteenth among the top “insourcing” countries (see table 1).  In other words, outsourcing
Table 1.  Business services:  largest insourcers and outsourcers,





(Millions of (Millions of
United States United States
dollars) dollars)
1 United States 58 794 1 United States 40 929
2 United Kingdom 36 740 2 Germany 39 113
3 Germany 27 907 3 Japan 24 714
4 France 20 864 4 Netherlands 21 038
5 Netherlands 20 074 5 Italy 20 370
6 India 18 630 6 France 19 111
8 Japan 17 401 9 United Kingdom 16 184
14 China 10 419 11 India 11 817
29 Russian Federation 2 012 18 China 7 957
20 Russian Federation 4 583
Source: Mary Amiti and Shang-Jin Wei (2004). Fear of Service Outsourcing:  Is It Justified?, IMF Working
Paper, WP/04/186, October.Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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is not a one-way street from developed to developing countries.  For instance, a number of
Indian outsourcing operations have left mid- and higher-margin activities in India and have
moved some lower-end activities to China and some South-East Asian countries such as the
Philippines (due to costs), while others have chosen to set up parallel bases in countries
such as Singapore, partly as an insurance policy (for instance, in the event that operations in
India or other places are disrupted).
Implications for Developed and
Developing Countries
As noted, the offshoring of services is a relatively new phenomenon that has
generated significant debate in the popular press and among policymakers.  The analytical
literature on the subject is still sparse but growing.  By and large, the literature analyses the
impact of outsourcing on output, trade, wages and distribution of income (Bhagwati and
others, 2004; Brainard and Litan, 2004).  In a nutshell, but at the risk of oversimplification,
the literature argues that efficiency and productivity gains achieved via offshoring should
enhance growth and employment opportunities for both industrial and developing countries.
For developing countries, offshoring seems to be unequivocally beneficial for
employment, exports and economic growth.  For instance, a number of countries in the
Asian and Pacific region with a large English-speaking population, an adequate ICT
infrastructure and a large pool of information technology professionals have been reaping
significant employment and income gains from these new possibilities and expect to
continue to do so.
What about industrial countries? Outsourcing allows for the relocation of
inefficient parts of the production process to another country where they can be produced
cheaply, freeing up resources so that the industrial country can specialize in the product and
in which it has a comparative advantage.  In this way, outsourcing leads to gains from trade
and improves economic welfare for all countries involved in the global division of labour.
Indeed, since a country’s comparative advantage in a final product is a weighted average of
its relative efficiency across constituent activities, the country can improve its overall
competitive edge by obtaining from abroad the components in which the country is less
efficient at producing/processing.  The long-run gains are also potentially mutual and
significant since jobs created offshore in developing countries generate demand for the
export of goods and services from industrial countries, not to mention the enhancement of
tourism and foreign direct investment inflows.  It is the age-old global wealth-creation
story, a win-win situation for all countries involved (i.e., insourcers and outsourcers).
That said, there will invariably be some short-term adjustment costs in terms of
job losses in certain sectors or industries.  However, this is not unique to outsourcing; it is
an inevitable consequence of any form of reallocation of resources to their most productiveAsia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
99
uses.  This is an important point worth emphasizing.  As with all types of trade, outsourcing
will lead to winners and losers.  The pertinent issue is that the winners (including
consumers, shareholders etc.) will exceed the losers as resources are optimally deployed
across countries.  In fact, before lamenting about the evils of using offshore service
providers, one must ask the question:  what is the viable alternative? If companies do not
outsource to reduce costs, while their competitors do so aggressively, they stand to lose
global and local market share to their foreign rivals.  The resulting adverse impact on
corporate profit growth will limit the creation of new capital and reinvestment in domestic
technology.  In the worst-case scenario, companies that do not outsource are weighed down
by ever-increasing costs, leading to eventual bankruptcy or a bail-out by taxpayers.
Attempting to save jobs in a particular segment of the workforce could have far-reaching
and costlier repercussions elsewhere.
As previously noted, there is a move from BPOs to KPOs, at least with regard to
some of the outsourcing to India.  This has fuelled concerns that conventional trade theory
is no longer relevant and an industrial country such as the United States will end up
outsourcing  all its service activities, both high- and low-end activities (Business Week,
2004).  However, such concerns are exaggerated, to say the least.  For example, there are
several types of services such as tourism, restaurant and catering that cannot be outsourced
as they require mode 2 of service provision (i.e., movement of consumers to the service
providers).
The dominant and most widely quoted projection of future job losses due to the
movement of jobs offshore is by the consulting company Forrester Research, which
predicted that 3.3 million United States services jobs were likely to be moved offshore by
2015 (McCarthy and others, 2002).  However, a subsequent report using United States
Bureau of Labor Statistics data found that about 70 per cent of workers losing jobs due to
outsourcing were re-employed (McKinsey Global Institute, 2003).  In other words, services
outsourcing should not lead to a fall in aggregate employment as enough new, and often
higher value added, jobs are created in other sectors.  As such, the perceived fears that
services outsourcing may lead to massive job losses on a net basis in the industrial
countries may be unfounded.  While none of the empirical studies should be taken as being
authoritative at this stage, they are indicative that one should not rush to pass negative
judgement on outsourcing just by virtue of the fact that there are gross job losses (Amiti and
Wei, 2004; Mann, 2003).  All this being said, it is a fact that outsourcing is disrupting usual
job patterns and assumptions regarding job security and has raised the overall level of
anxiety of blue- and white-collar workers worldwide.  It is imperative that these anxieties
be appropriately managed if support for globalization is to remain intact.Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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Concluding Remarks
It is clear that changes in technology are enabling an increasing number of
activities to be traded internationally.  Outsourcing wisely and taking advantage of the new
division of labour should be an integral part of continued corporate and economic
restructuring if the country, industrial or developing, is to remain globally competitive in
the longer term.  Myopic protectionist tendencies and simplistic arguments that prevent the
optimum allocation of resources (i.e., global division of labour) should be refuted.  The
focus of well-meaning unions and policymakers should instead be on relieving anxieties
and helping displaced workers to develop new skills so that they remain relevant and
employable, rather than lamenting the loss of some existing jobs in areas in which the
country is no longer competitive.  Governments and multilateral agencies should also work
towards improving the quality of services trade data and the official statistics on
outsourcing, as this would help to mitigate any false perceptions arising from outsourcing.
Many developing countries in Asia and the Pacific and elsewhere stand to gain
significantly from the outsourcing phenomenon, just as East Asia benefited from the
fragmentation and offshore dispersion of manufactured goods (such as electronics).  It is
therefore in the best interests of developing countries to lobby strongly for more extensive
and faster global liberalization of services, as it can benefit offshoring activities in two
ways (Wunsch and Mattoo, 2004).  One is by way of liberalization of services through
mode 4 (temporary movement of natural persons), which facilitates the movement of
skilled professionals across developed and developing countries; it has a direct impact on
offshore outsourcing.  The other is by way of mode 3 (commercial presence), especially in
higher-end outsourcing activities such as research and development and product design.
However, the promotion of higher-end outsourcing activities into developing
countries would require the liberalization of supporting services related to infrastructure
(namely, transportation and logistics), as well as enhancing domestic legislation and
provisions relating to data privacy, tax treatment, data protection and security, and the
protection of intellectual property rights.  Thus, it is imperative that external liberalization
be accompanied by appropriate domestic policy reforms if a country is to maximize its net
benefits from integrating with the global economy.Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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T
he ESCAP secretariat periodically organizes high-level policy dialogues to
facilitate a common understanding of issues of mutual interest among
members and associate members of ESCAP.  The publication entitled Delivering on the
WTO Round:  A High-level Government-Business Dialogue, published as No. 56 in the
ESCAP series on Studies in Trade and Investment (ST/ESCAP/2393, United Nations
publication, Sales No. E.06.II.F.4) is a compilation of selected papers and statements
presented at the High-level Government-Business Dialogue, which took place on 4 and
5 October 2005 in Macao, China.  The publication provides insights into the status of the
negotiations in the main areas of the Doha Development Agenda and their interlinkages
with business and economic development in Asia and the Pacific.  It contains both
qualitative and quantitative assessments of trade liberalization at the multilateral
regional/bilateral levels for poverty reduction and development.  Special attention is given
to harnessing the trade negotiation process for the realization of the Millennium
Development Goals.  Special attention is also given to the potential of multilateral trade
liberalization to fight poverty, the prospects for consolidation of preferential trade
agreements of the region and the value of business advocacy and multistakeholder policy
dialogues in promoting informed trade policy decision-making.  As mentioned in the
preface, it is hoped that this publication will contribute to advancing the debate in further
support of the endeavors of the Governments and people of the Asian and Pacific region on
trade as a means of securing prosperous and sustainable development.
The global production system is essential to economic efficiency and consumer
welfare but can easily be blocked by the complexity of rules adopted at different levels:
local, regional and global.  Transparent, fair and predictable rules for trade at the
multilateral level are superior to a myriad of overlapping and mutually conflicting bilateral
and regional rules that are emerging out of hyperactive negotiations on preferential trade
agreements in the region.  While the presumption has been that full trade liberalization in
even small pockets of the global economy would translate into wider and wider areas of
free trade, many trade agreements fail to create trade successfully enough to trigger this
Delivering on the WTO Round:
A High-level Government-Business
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domino effect.  Instead, trade costs are being increased and gains lost.  Chapter III argues
that preferential trade could be tamed through geographical, functional or institutional
consolidation to create integrated markets, which can support modern global production.
Since global production is inclusive, this increase in trade frictions affects all:  knowledge-
intensive jobs, manufacturing jobs, jobs creating components and inputs and service-related
jobs.  In the publication, Victor Fung urges all stakeholders to work towards a successful
outcome of the Doha Round (pp. 14-15).  He claims that “the multilateral system enables
each location around the world to contribute according to its skills and capabilities and to
develop its own competitive advantage.  Modern production systems are multilateral, not
bilateral.  Multilateralism democratizes the global economy – there is indeed place for
everyone”.
The study indicates that in poor countries significant gains from global trade
reforms are conditional on actions to induce new employment opportunities, higher wages
and a move out of subsistence agricultural activities.  Domestic supply constraints are the
main reason for the lack of trade growth and diversification in many of the poorest
developing countries.  Improving supply capacities and regulatory measures in global trade
reform that locks right trade policy regimes in place and mechanisms to correct imbalances
could provide a strong engine of growth to the region, as discussed in chapter II of the study.
Chapters IV, V and VI provide state of play in three important areas of the current
negotiation round:  agriculture, services and trade facilitation.  Chapter IV provides
a comprehensive analysis of agriculture negotiation dynamics and discusses some
suggestions for moving this part of negotiations closer to a successful ending, including
stronger consensus-building among developing countries in the region.  Services are an
increasingly important sector for the economic performance of developing countries.
Chapter V argues that, while these countries have export market interests in many types of
services, which makes them interested in the successful outcome of services negotiations
under WTO, the main contribution of this negotiation is in support for domestic reform in
the service sector.  Trade facilitation moved from the pre-Cancun negotiation agenda to the
top of the July Framework of the Doha work programme.  Chapter VI explains the
implications of this negotiation on Governments, businesses and regional organizations.
Many developing countries have been concerned with the costs that would arise from full
implementation of what has been negotiated under trade facilitation (and other areas) and
some show reluctance to commit to further trade liberalization without having secured
financial and other assistance in the process.  Chapter VII discusses the opportunities and
challenges stemming from multilateral trade liberalization and presents the instruments
available at the International Monetary Fund to help members to deal with the various
challenges, including surveillance/research, financial assistance, technical assistance and
broader aid for trade initiatives.
The publication is available online at:  <www.unescap.org/tid/publication/tipub2393.
asp>.Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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T
his publication (ST/ESCAP/2394) highlights the importance of corporate
social responsibility (CSR).  CSR comprises an increasingly well-developed
set of issues and practices that are globally applicable but which vary between countries,
industries and companies.  One of the most important aspects of CSR relates to supply-chain
management and remains relevant to the small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) sector.
There are clear benefits resulting from the implementation of CSR in supply
chains and for the SME sector, in particular.  Some of the main benefits are associated with
image, reputation, brands, costs, risk reduction and opportunities for developing better
business.
Many examples of good CSR practices abound in the region; however, the study
highlights initiatives that address some of the obstacles to implementing CSR, such as the
movement towards industry-wide codes of conduct, training and capacity-building
initiatives, empowering women workers, developing multistakeholder initiatives, creating
worker committees and promoting human rights.
While international standards linked to CSR practices have a role to play in supply
chains, an interesting recent development has been the establishment of home-grown social
responsibility standards.  The proliferation of the standards along with competing codes of
conduct frustrates the SME sector in the sense that there is a conflict between obeying the
law and codes of conduct and staying in business.  There is therefore a new emphasis on
moving beyond such approaches and towards building relationships with suppliers based on
shared values, trust and the provision of consultancy services in place of inspections.  This
shift is highly dependent on increasing CSR-related capacity in supply chains.
The good CSR practices in the region include initiatives concerning human rights
and labour standards.  Nevertheless, good practices in CSR also extend to community
investment, the environment, conservation and health.  Many good CSR practices are not
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achieved by business working alone but with Government and civil society organizations.
An emphasis on tripartite partnerships in the region is therefore likely to promote good CSR
practices in the future.
Despite clear benefits for SMEs in the long run, many obstacles exist for SMEs
wanting to engage in CSR.  The main problems are associated with a lack of awareness of
CSR issues and practices, costs of engagement, a lack of suitable trained and skilled human
resources, inefficient management systems, competing codes of conduct, an overemphasis
on factory inspections, a lack of transparency and poor procurement practices.
The study underscores the importance of sharing experience and knowledge in the
region and to develop initiatives based on partnerships capable of developing CSR capacity.
The final chapter of the study proposes a number of recommendations for various actors
including ESCAP and other international organizations, Governments, enterprises and
business associations and other relevant stakeholders in the region.
The publication and related materials are available online at:  <www.unescap.org/
tid/publication/indpub2394.asp>.Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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T
he Handbook (ST/ESCAP/2374) was developed by ESCAP in cooperation
with the International Trade Centre (ITC UNCTAD/WTO).  It is targeted
mainly at officials from ministries in charge of trade who need to acquire a basic
understanding of trade finance and the importance of trade finance infrastructure
development.  Information provided in the Handbook is expected to help strengthen the
trade finance aspects of national trade development strategies and to foster a better
understanding of the issues and mechanisms that may need to be discussed with officials in
charge of financial sector regulation and supervision.  The Handbook may also provide
a platform for financial system regulators to better understand the point of view of trade
officials and traders and their needs.  Selected chapters may also be of interest to officials
from ministries or agencies in charge of information and communication technology, with
the main responsibilities of developing e-commerce, online banking and e-payment
systems.
The first chapter provides a general introduction to trade finance and trade finance
infrastructure development; an overview of trade finance methods and instruments is given
in chapter II.  Legal issues and conventions related to the main trade finance instruments are
discussed in chapter III; chapter IV is dedicated to structured trade and commodity finance.
The relationship between trade finance and the macroeconomic environment is examined in
chapter V and the importance of institutions for trade finance development is highlighted in
chapter VI.  Issues related to international payment systems and e-trade finance
development are addressed in chapters VII and VIII.  The Handbook concludes with
a proposed trade finance infrastructure development framework based on the ITC trade
finance pointers methodology and inspired by the ESCAP Trade Facilitation Framework.
This Handbook is one of the products developed under a three-year project funded
through the United Nations Development Account and aimed at building the capacity of
selected ESCAP member countries with economies in transition in the area of trade and
investment, with a view to enabling them to respond more effectively to the challenges and
Trade Finance Infrastructure
Development Handbook for
Economies in TransitionAsia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
110
opportunities emerging from the globalization process.  As part of this project, a series of
eight national training workshops on trade finance infrastructure development were held in
Central Asia, the South Caucasus and Mongolia.  Most of the training material developed
for these workshops is summarized in this Handbook and an accompanying CD-ROM.
The publication is available online in English at:  <www.unescap.org/tid/publication/
tipub2374.asp> and in Russian at:  <www.unescap.org/tid/publication/tipub2374_rus.pdf>.Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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